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Abstract 
This paper applies an empirical framework, combining the use of ordered probit 
approach, novel real-time data set and decision-making meetings of monetary authority as a 
unit of observation, to estimate highly systematic reaction patterns between policy rate 
decisions of the National Bank of Poland and incoming economic data for the period 1999 - 
2007. The paper measures the empirical significance of rate discreteness and demonstrates 
that both the discrete-choice approach and real-time “policy-meeting” data do matter in the 
econometric identification of Polish monetary policy. 
The study detects structural breaks in policy, which switched its focus from current to 
expected inflation and from exchange rate to real activity. The response to inflationary 
expectation is shown to be highly asymmetrical depending on whether the expectation is above 
or below the inflation target. The policy rate appears to be driven by key economic indicators 
without evidence for intentional interest-rate smoothing by central bank. The estimated rules 
explain correctly 95 percent of observed policy actions and surpass the market anticipation, 
made one day prior to a policy meeting, both in and out of sample. 
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“The central bank must have a highly regular and predictable policy 
rule or response pattern that links policy actions to the state of the 
economy.” 
-- W. Poole, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis1 
“It is not possible to make use of a simple policy rule, which could be 
known ex ante to market participants.” 
-- Monetary Policy Council, National Bank of Poland2 
 
The discreteness of policy rates, both in magnitude (the adjustments are typically made 
in multiples of 25 basis points) and timing (the policy actions take place usually 8-12 times a 
year), is a common feature of contemporary monetary policy-making in many countries. This 
study applies an empirical methodology (well suited for many central banks) to identify the 
monetary policy by combining the use of discrete-choice approach, real-time data and 
policymaking meetings of monetary authority as a unit of observation. The paper estimates 
highly systematic response patterns between the interest rate decisions of the National Bank of 
Poland (NBP) and incoming economic data, available for both policymakers and private public 
in the real-time setting. 
The specification search is conducted with a wide spectrum of potential explanatory 
variables among those monitored by the central bank, and refined by the Andrews’ tests for a 
structural change with unknown change point. The paper compares the discrete-response 
versus conventional continuous approach to estimate the policy rules as well as shows that 
using the monthly averages of ex post revised data instead of real-time non-aggregated one 
distorts our understanding of policy decisions. 
A separate contribution of paper is the compilation of Polish real-time data set 
incorporating the original time series, truly available to policymakers at each policy-setting 
meeting during the period 1998 - 2007. To the best of my knowledge, such data set has never 
been used in modeling Polish monetary policy and has proved to be fruitful. 
Many economic decisions rely on inflationary expectations, while inflation predictability 
depends on the consistency of monetary policy. More transparent and predictable behaviour of 
central bank itself improves the transmission and effectiveness of monetary policy, as many 
                                                 
1 See Poole (2003). 
2 See “Monetary policy guidelines” for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007; e.g., see NBP (2006), p. 5. 
academic economists and central banks’ practitioners seem to agree nowadays1. Over the past 
two decades most central banks, including the NBP, have radically increased the public 
communication as well as disclosure of internal information and methodology used in the 
monetary policy-making2. 
An obvious way to facilitate the predictability of monetary policy is to utilize a “rule”, 
which is “nothing more than a systematic decision-making process that uses information in a 
consistent and predictable way” (Meltzer, 1993). Starting at least with a classic paper by 
Kydland and Prescott (1977), many economists conclude that pre-commitment to a rule can 
have beneficial and stabilizing outcomes3. Operating under the policy rule not only enhances 
central bank’s accountability, credibility and transparency, but, according to Poole (1999), “also 
provides the surest method to pass the accumulated knowledge about the effective operation of 
monetary policy to future generations”, and, perhaps, the only way to improve the practice of 
monetary policy. Indeed, in order to improve it one has to obtain a clear empirical description of 
what is going to be improved, for example, an econometric identification of current policy. It is 
really hard to evaluate the policy without describing it, using an algebraic formula or “rule”.  
In the light of NBP’s statement that “it is not possible to make use of a simple policy rule 
which could be known ex ante to market participants” (NBP, 2006), it is an interesting empirical 
exercise: to uncover a systematic component of central bank’s policy. Such econometric 
modelling can help market participants make more efficient decisions by minimizing the 
uncertainty about future policy actions: “What the market needs to know is the policy response 
function by which the central bank acts in a consistent way over time” (Poole, 2003). Besides, 
the policy rate is a key determinant of other short-term market interest rates. Furthermore, “if 
practitioners in financial markets gain a better understanding of how policy is likely to respond to 
incoming information, asset prices and bond yields will tend to respond to economic data in 
ways that further the central bank's policy objectives” (Bernanke, 2007). 
It must be the case that the central bank pursues the regularity of some sort, though 
there is no simple and fixed policy rule, mechanically followed under any circumstances. Rather, 
the central bank pays attention to a variety of statistical data and other information, and 
considers several alternative rules, used as policy guidelines and combined with anecdotal 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Bernanke (2007), Blinder (1998, 2005), Carpenter (2004), Faust and Svensson (2001), 
Geraats (2001, 2002), Ingves (2007), Issing (2005), Kennedy (2008), Kohn (2008), Poole (2003, 2005), 
Thornton (2003). 
2 See Łyziak et al. (2006) on the transparency of NBP’s monetary policy. 
3 See, e.g., Barro and Gordon (1983a, 1983b), Barro (1986), Calvo (1978), Clarida et al. (2000), Dennis 
and Soderstrom (2006), Svensson (1999a, 1999b, 2002), Taylor (1993, 1999), Woodford (1999a). The 
“rules versus discretion” academic debate has a long history – see, e.g., Wicksell (1898), Simons (1936). 
evidence and judgment. We can reasonably assume that the policy-generating process consists 
of two components, regular and non-regular one: the central bank reacts consistently to some 
internal sophisticated assessment of the economy, but occasionally (in the case of transitory or 
anomalous shock to the economy, strike, financial crisis, natural disaster, etc.) departs from the 
regularity. The specific characteristics of systematic component are inside a black box -- they 
are unobservable for public. However, we can proxy for the underlying determinants of policy 
actions by looking at the consequential systematic links between adjustments to policy rates 
and movements in various observable fundamentals. 
The estimated models, being a simplification of true policy-making process, might 
effectively reflect its essence, and could be applied as a useful benchmark for explaining past 
policy decisions and predicting future ones, even though the NBP certainly does not view itself 
as implementing a “simple policy rule”. Besides, knowing a correct central bank’s “reaction 
function” is also a necessary element of macroeconomic models, used to forecast the 
developments in the economy and evaluate the effects of economic shocks, monetary and fiscal 
policy actions. Finally, “clarity about the central bank's policy objectives and strategy may help 
anchor the public's long-term inflation expectations, which can substantially improve the efficacy 
of policy and the overall functioning of the economy” (Bernanke, 2007). 
This paper differs from the previous empirical research on Polish monetary policy rules 
in the following aspects: (i) it accounts for the discreteness of policy rates by applying an 
ordered probit model; (ii) it models the policymakers’ response to an information set available at 
the decision-making meetings of monetary authority rather than the relationship between the 
monthly or quarterly averages of policy rate and economic indicators; (iii) it avoids the distortion 
of information by using only the real-time data, i.e. the historical time series as they were known 
at any policy-making meeting, rather than the latest revised versions of data; (iv) it avoids the 
problem of simultaneity, which is typical for the time-aggregated data due to possible 
interactions between the policy rate and other economic variables that can happen during a 
period of aggregation; (v) it conducts thorough tests for structural changes in policy regime with 
unknown change point; (vi) it directly models the administered policy rate rather than the market 
short-term interest rates; (vii) it analyzes the period 1999 - 2007, when the short-term interest 
rates have been a principal tool and a single measure of monetary policy; (viii) instead of the 
level rules it estimates the difference rules that are more operational and transparent for public1; 
(ix) it is not focused on a limited amount of statistical data, but instead uses in the specification 
                                                 
1 See Orphanides and Williams (2006) for comparison of the level and difference rule approaches under 
the framework of imperfect knowledge. 
search a wide spectrum of economic and financial indicators; (x) the estimated interest rate 
rules have far higher measures of fit and out-of-sample forecasting performance. 
 
2. Related literature 
 
 The literature on Polish monetary policy rules is summarized in Table 1. These studies 
estimate the interest rate rules for the period from 1991-1995 through 2000-2004. However, 
prior to 1998 the Polish monetary policy was rather eclectic with the managed exchange rate 
regime and changing policy instruments: the direct inflation targeting with the short-term interest 
rates as a principal tool of monetary policy has been fully implemented only in 1999. 
Several studies estimate NBP’s reaction functions in the context of vector 
autoregression (VAR) modeling of Polish economy (Golinelli and Rovelli [2005], Hristov [2005], 
Kłos and Wróbel [2001], Kokoszczyński et al. [2006], Maliszewski [2003], Wróbel and 
Pawłowska [2002]). However, the VARs are focused on identifying the monetary policy shocks 
and responses of key economic indicators to them rather than on identifying the interest rate 
reaction functions. The policy rules estimated using the VAR models typically have poor in- and 
out-of-sample forecasting performance, compared to the non-VAR models (see Rudebusch, 
1998a, b). Rudebusch points out the following shortcomings of the standard VAR interest rate 
rules: a) time-invariant and linear structure; b) limited information set, which leads to omitting the 
relevant explanatory variables; c) long distributed lags, resulting in spurious in-sample fitting. 
Brzozowski (2004) and Mohanty and Klau (2004) estimate the non-VAR policy rules. 
Both studies use quarterly data averages (the latter also tries the monthly averages), short-term 
market interest rates as a dependent variable and the Taylor-rule specification1.  
 Only a few papers in the empirical literature on monetary policy rules apply the discrete 
regression techniques to address the discreteness of policy rates. Studies by Dupor et al. 
(2005), Hu and Philips (2004), Lapp et al. (2003), Piazzesi (2005) use the ordered probit to 
model three possible policy choices (to decrease, leave unchanged or increase the interest rate) 
of the US Federal Reserve (Fed), while Dueker (1999) and Hamilton and Jorda (2002) employ 
                                                 
1 Taylor (1993) proposed a monetary policy rule, where the US Federal Reserve alters the federal funds 
rate (FFR) according to the following formula: 
FFRt = πt + 0.5Yt + 0.5(πt – π*) + R, 
where R - the “equilibrium” real interest rate, π* - the long-run inflation target, π – the inflation rate over a 
year (as a proxy for the expected inflation), Y – the output gap (the percent deviation of real GDP from the 
potential one). Taylor assumed R = 2 and π* = 2. The Taylor rule contributed to better understanding of 
monetary policy and was widely modified and extended in a number of ways in the subsequent literature. 
the ordered probit with five categories (corresponding to 50, 25, 0, -25 and -50 basis point 
changes). Eichengreen et al. (1985) and Davutyan and Parke (1995) apply the dynamic ordered 
probit with three and five categories, respectively, to model Bank of England’s policy interest 
rate changes. Dolado et al. (2005) estimate the interest rate-setting behavior of Banque de 
France, Bundesbank, Banco de España, and the Fed, using the ordered probit model with five 
categories. Podpiera (2007) combines the ordered probit and censored regressions to estimate 
interest rate rules of the Fed and Czech National Bank. Kotłowski (2006) estimates triple-choice 
ordered logit, modeling the direction of change in the restrictiveness of monetary policy 
proposed by a given member of the Monetary Policy Council in Poland. The restrictiveness is 
measured by the proposed change of policy bias and/or change to the reference rate. 
Unfortunately, the sample includes only 18 monthly observations for the period 2004/02 – 
2005/07, not enough for a reliable likelihood estimation. 
 A growing number of recent works employ the real-time data to address the subsequent 
revisions of statistical data, and overwhelmingly show that different vintages of US, Japanese, 
Euro area, German, Swiss and Norwegian data lead to significantly different results1. Therefore, 
the estimation of policy rules based on ex post revised data distorts our understanding of past 
monetary policy -- an obvious, but routinely neglected by most studies point. 
 Using the decision-making meetings of monetary authority as a unit of observation is an 
approach, which carefully mimics the actual decision-making process, but seems to be 
commonly ignored in the literature. Instead, the researchers habitually estimate the systematic 
relationship between the monthly or quarterly averages of policy rates and economic variables. 
  
3. Background of Polish monetary policy 
 
 In the period 1995-1997 the NBP conducted the monetary policy by controlling the 
money supply growth and targeting the exchange rate. The exchange rate regime was gradually 
transformed from managed to free-floating one during the 1990s. The monthly rate of crawl was 
progressively reduced from 1.8 percent in 1991 to 0.3 percent in 1999. The pre-announced 
crawling peg system was superseded by the crawling band regime in May 1995. The crawling 
band width was widened from ±7 percent in 1995 up to ±15 percent in 1999, and finally 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Bernhardsen et al. (2004), Croushore and Stark (2001, 2003), Clausen and Meier (2005), 
Gerberding (2004), Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2005), Ghysels et al. (2000), Kamada (2004), Kugler et al. 
(2004), Lansing (2002), Orphanides et al. (2000), Orphanides (2001a, 2001b, 2002, 2003), Perez (2000), 
Runkle (1998), Sterken (2003), Tetlow and Ironside (2005). 
abandoned -- in April 2000 zloty started floating officially. Actually, the NBP suspended foreign 
exchange interventions already in mid-1998, de facto entering the floating exchange rate regime 
(Pruski and Szpunar, 2005). Consequently, during the 1990s the exchange rate has been 
steadily losing its role of an operating tool of monetary policy. 
 The critical institutional changes in Polish monetary policy occurred in 1998. In January 
the direct inflation targeting (DIT) was implicitly adopted as a primary monetary policy strategy. 
The DIT assumes the direct target for official consumer price index and lack of indirect targets 
such as the money supply or exchange rate. In October the DIT was officially declared1 by the 
Monetary Policy Council (MPC) – a new independent policy-making body. The MPC was 
founded in February 1998, soon after the independence of the NBP had been strengthened by 
the new Constitution and new Act on the NBP. The Council consists of the President of the NBP 
and nine other members appointed in equal proportions by the President of Poland, the Sejm 
and the Senate of the Parliament for a term of six years. 
The MPC immediately stopped the long-term interest rate operations by shortening the 
maximum maturity of NBP’s money bills from 270 to 28 days, abandoned the monetary base 
targeting, expanded the exchange rate flexibility toward the free floating system, increased the 
role of short-term interest rates as a primary way of pursuing the DIT, and began declaring an 
inflation target in the form of annual growth rate of consumer price index. Since 1998 every fall 
the MPC announces the inflation target (along with the permissible bandwidth around it) to be 
attained by the end of next year (see Figure 1). From 1998 to 2006 the annual growth rate of 
consumer prices in Poland has dropped from 14 to less than 2 percent (see Figure 1) -- 
arguably, an impressive outcome of implemented monetary policy. 
Overall, since 1998 the short-term interest rates may be undoubtedly treated as a 
principal instrument and a single measure of Polish monetary policy. Since the policy rates have 
been always set administratively by the monetary authorities and have never been the outcome 
of market interaction of supply and demand, it makes them of special interest for econometric 
modeling. 
There are three NBP’s policy rates. The reference rate2, introduced in January 1998, 
sets the path of monetary policy and “determines the minimum yield obtainable on main open 
market operations, influencing, at the same time, the level of interbank deposit rates for 
comparable maturities” (NBP, 2005). The deposit and lombard rates, introduced in 1993, set the 
fluctuation band for overnight interbank interest rates. The open market operations -- the sale or 
                                                 
1 See NBP (1998). 
2 The rate on 28-day (from 1998 to 2003), 14-day (from 2003 to 2005), and 7-day (since 2005 to present) 
NBP’s money market bills. 
purchase of securities or foreign currencies and issue of own-debt securities – help balance the 
demand and supply of funds held by the commercial banks at the central bank, and have been 
used to manage the short-term interest rates on the interbank market already since 1993. 
 
4. Data and modelling framework 
  
4.1. Discreteness of policy rates 
 The dependent variable is a change (including non-zero ones) to the reference rate 
made by the MPC at a decision-making meeting. The NBP has always altered the levels of 
policy rates in discrete adjustments – the multiples of 25 basis points (a quarter of one percent). 
Table 2 shows the history of the reference rate for the period 1998/02 - 2006/10. The frequency 
distribution of the reference rate adjustments is reported in Table 3.1: all 105 historical rate 
changes took only eleven values, between -250 and 250 basis points. Table 3.1 and Figure 2 
exhibit two distinct phases in the historical behavior of the reference rate: the high-volatility 
period prior to April 2002 (when all changes, except the first one in February 1998, were by 
absolute value between 100 and 250 basis points) and the low-volatility period since April 2002 
(when all changes were by absolute value either 25 or 50 basis points). 
The reference rate adjustments are distributed heterogeneously: 95 out of 105 changes 
fall into 5 out of 11 observed discrete cases. There are three or less observations in six 
categories of dependent variable. It is not sufficient for a reliable maximum likelihood estimation. 
A usual approach under such circumstances is to consolidate some adjacent categories with 
small number of observations. For example, we could merge all observed changes into four 
categories: “decrease 1% or more”, “decrease 0.25% or 0.50%”, “no change” and “increase” 
with 8, 63, 20 and 14 observations, respectively. However, due to above-mentioned two periods 
with different volatility of the reference rate such a quadruple classification does not allow 
conducting the tests for a structural change. Indeed, at the high-volatility period 1998/02 - 
2002/03 all rate changes fall into following three categories: “decrease 1% or more”, “no 
change” or “increase”, while at the low-volatility period 2002/04 - 2006/10 the only three realized 
cases are: “decrease 0.25% or 0.50%”, “no change” or “increase” (see Table 3.1). After splitting 
the sample at any point prior to March or after April 2002, the dependent variable will have 
different number of categories (three and four) in the two sub-samples. Therefore, to make 
possible performing the parameter instability tests all observed rate changes are combined into 
following three categories: “decrease”, “no change” or “increase” (see Table 3.2). The only 
consequence of such consolidation is the loss of efficiency – adding (or deleting) another 
cutpoint does not affect the structural latent model (see equations (1) and (2) in section 4.2). 
However, it is still definitely able to represent the essence of the NBP’s operating policy1. 
Fortunately, after detecting a structural break in April 2002, the period 2002/04 - 2006/10 
was analyzed using the finer quadruple classification: “down 0.50%”, “down 0.25%”, “no 
change” and “up” with 3, 32, 11 and 9 observations, respectively (see Table 3.3). This 
classification closely corresponds to the historical policy rate adjustments in this period: only two 
observed adjacent categories -- the “up 0.25%” and “up 0.50%” with one and two observations, 
respectively – have been consolidated. 
 
4.2. Ordered probit model 
To address the discreteness of dependent variable the paper employs an ordered probit 
approach, which forms a probabilistic forecast of discrete adjustments to the policy rate as a 
nonlinear function of explanatory variables.  
This approach assumes an underlying level of the reference rate RRt* that would have 
been observed had the NBP been willing to make the continuous (rather than discrete) changes 
to the rate. At every policy-rate-setting meeting t the NBP determines the change ΔRRt* = RRt* - 
RR*t-1 in this latent rate according to the following formula: 
ΔRRt* = Xtβ + εt                                                            (1)               
where εt ~ normal iid (0, σ²) and Xt is a matrix that may incorporate any data relevant for the 
policymakers and available at date t. Matrix Xt may include the variables in any form (levels, first 
and second differences) and at any original data frequency. 
Although RRt* is unobserved, the NBP announces the official (i.e. observed) adjustments 
to the reference rate ΔRRt according to the following rule: 
ΔRRt = k1        if            ΔRRt* ≤  α1 
  ΔRRt =  kj       if    αj-1 < ΔRRt* ≤  αj   and 1 < j < J                       (2) 
                                                 ΔRRt =  kJ       if   αJ-1 < ΔRRt* 
                                                 
1 For the related applications of an ordered probit model with such a triple classification to study, for 
example, the US Federal funds rate target see, e. g., Dupor et al. (2005), Hu and Philips (2004), Lapp et 
al. (2003). 
where k1, k2, …, kJ-1, kJ  – observed discrete-valued changes to the policy rate (multiples of the 
25 basis points), J is a number of observed discrete cases, and -∞ = α0  < α1  < α2  < … < αJ-1 < 
αJ   = ∞ are unknown thresholds to be estimated. 
 Assuming Gaussian cumulative distribution function F of εt, it follows that the 
probabilities of observing each possible outcome of ΔRR are 
                                                      =     F(α1 - Xtβ)                           if          j = 1 
             Pr (ΔRRt = kj | Xt,  β, α)   =     F(αj - Xtβ) - F(αj-1 - Xtβ)        if        1 < j < J                      (3) 
                                                      =     1 -  F(αJ - Xtβ)                     if          j = J  
 The estimates of β and α can be obtained by making identifying assumptions (typically, 
that Var(εt|X) = 1 and the intercept β0 = 0 ) and maximizing the log likelihood function ln L: 
                                              Ln L = ∑t ∑j  dtj ln [F(αj - Xtβ) - F(αj-1 - Xtβ)],                                   (4) 
where t = 1, 2, …, N;  N is the sample size, and dtj = 1 if ΔRRt = kj and 0 otherwise. 
  
4.3. Policy meetings as a unit of observation 
 The paper departs from a common practice of employing the quarterly or monthly data 
averages and uses instead more adequate sample construction. The sample observations are 
all MPC’s meetings, when the decisions on the policy rate have been made. The MPC has 
always taken such decisions once a month, in the second half. The dependent variable is a 
reference rate change made at a given MPC’s meeting. The data on the right-hand-side 
variables is taken as it was observed at a date of making policy decision, so it consists of 
already predetermined variables, which are independent of the rate setting at that MPC’s 
meeting. The raw data is used in all types of original frequency: daily, monthly and quarterly. 
The above data construction avoids the simultaneity problem, which can occur in 
modeling the systematic responses of policy rates’ averages to economic variables’ averages 
for a given month or quarter due to possible interactions between the policy rate and the other 
variables that can happen during a period of aggregation. Furthermore, this sample design 
mimics carefully the timing of policy decisions and availability of statistical data, and hence 
carefully simulates the actual policy-action-generating process. 
 
4.4. Specification search 
The empirical research on monetary policy tends to focus on a limited amount of data. 
Indeed, the central banks look at everything and monitor hundreds of economic variables: “The 
central bank takes into account all available information about factors increasing or decreasing 
inflationary pressure and causing a rise or fall of probability of achieving the inflation target 
assumed in the given period” (NBP, 1999). What does the MPC watch? Typically at each policy-
setting meeting the Council discusses an impact on the future inflation, resulting from the 
current tendencies and forecasts of various economic and financial factors such as: the prices 
and inflationary expectations; the real sector of economy; the money supply; the credit and 
lending; the market interest rates; the exchange rates; the external economic conditions; the 
situation in the balance of payments and in public finance sector; the labor market and wages. 
After each policy meeting the MPC issues a press statement, announcing the decision 
made and its justification. The Inflation Report, released quarterly, contains the description of 
monetary policy conduct during the last three months along with the minutes of MPC’s 
meetings. Starting with April 2007 the minutes of MPC’s meetings have been published 
separately each month in a week before the next policy-making meeting. The study utilizes 
careful reading of MPC’s statements to identify the determinants of policy actions, and 
considers a wide spectrum of economic and financial indicators as candidate explanatory 
variables. 
Table 4 describes the data used in the specification search.  The potential explanatory 
variables are divided into twelve groups: current inflation (price indexes), inflationary 
expectations, gross domestic product and main components, other measures of real activity, 
real sector expectations, labor market and wages, employment expectations, market interest 
rates, exchange rates, exchange rates' expectations, foreign policy interest rates, lending and 
credit. Specification search is performed among all possible combinations of variables from 
Table 4 (however, each specification was restricted to include no more than one variable from 
every group). All variables are measured in the various forms: levels, growth rates over different 
time spans, spreads and deviations, moving averages, changes (or growth rates) since the last 
MPC’s meeting and since the date of the last non-zero move in the policy rate. In addition, the 
study checks for asymmetric responses to the negative and positive shocks. Table 5 describes 
the transformations made to the original data. 
 
 
4.5. Real-time data 
To make the realistic assumptions about the timing of latest information available to the 
MPC at any meeting in the past the study pays careful attention to the historical release dates of 
all candidate explanatory variables and carefully scrutinizes MPC’s press statements following 
each policy-setting meeting. 
Major economic data are released at either monthly or quarterly frequency with a 
publication lag up to three months. Some monthly economic indicators are usually available for 
the policymakers with a one-month lag, while the others are known with a two-month lag. The 
policy decisions sometimes take place in a middle of the month, prior to some regular data 
releases, as it happened, for example, at a meeting on December 16-17, 2003, when “until the 
meeting of the Council the November figures relating to the industrial and construction sector 
output, retail sales, the PPI, the unemployment rate, base inflation and inflationary expectations 
were not disclosed” (NBP, 2003). All the above-mentioned indicators are typically available for 
the previous month. Likewise, the availability of quarterly data at each meeting varies from 
month to month and from year to year, depending on the varying dates of quarterly data 
releases and MPC’s meetings. For example, at a meeting on November 24, 2004 the third 
quarter’s data on GDP was already available, while at a meeting on November 26, 2003 the 
latest available data was for the second quarter only. 
Table 6 reports the timing and availability of quarterly and monthly statistical data at 
each MPC’s meeting. The information on historical release calendars for all potential regressors 
was gathered both from the official web-sites and through the requests to appropriate statistical 
agencies. The data released daily is taken for the business day preceding the meeting’s day. 
To avoid the distortion of information the study compiles and uses the novel Polish real-
time data set, containing the historical time series truly available to the policymakers at each 
decision-making meeting during the period 1998-2007. The latest versions of data commonly 
used in the empirical research may differ from the real-time ones because of the revisions. 
Table 4 describes the “MPC meeting” data set, which contains the real-time vintages of about 
140 economic and financial indicators such as: price indexes; inflationary expectations; gross 
domestic product and main components; data from business tendency survey in construction, 
industry and retail trade and Reuters survey of commercial banks’ analysts; industrial 
production; retail and whole sale of goods; investments; labor market and wages; market 
interest rates; exchange rates; foreign policy rates; lending and credit. Most of the above 
variables are not subject to statistical revisions, so the real-time aspect of these data deals only 
with the accurate synchronizing the dates of policy decisions and timing of data releases. The 
variables that have been revised since the beginning of sample period include: the consumer 
price index; the real indexes and values (in current prices) of domestic demand, final 
consumption expenditure of households, gross domestic product, gross fixed capital formation 
and gross value added; the industrial production, both total and manufacturing; and the 
registered unemployed persons. 
 
4.6. Tests for structural change 
The study thoroughly checks for the breaks in policy regime using Andrews’ (1993) sup-
LR test for structural change with unknown change point. It is the generalization of Chow 
breakpoint test for a wide class of linear and non-linear parametric models. Instead of testing for 
a single break at a given point in Andrews’ test the likelihood ratios between the restricted and 
unrestricted models are computed for all points in the testing period (in the restricted model the 
parameters are restricted to be constant for the whole period, while in the unrestricted one the 
parameters are estimated separately for the two sub-periods). To do so the first 34 and the last 
35 observations in the sample period 1999/02 – 2006/10 are preserved, the separate 
estimations for each sub-sample are performed, and the LR is computed for each monthly point 
from November 2001 through November 2003. The point with the maximum LR is the best 
candidate for the structural change, provided that the LR exceeds an asymptotical critical value, 
which depends on the size of both the whole sample and testing period. 
 
5. Estimation results1 
 
5.1. Tests for stationarity 
All variables are checked for stationarity using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit 
root tests. The lag order of lagged first differences of dependent variable in the tests is chosen 
according to a criterion of no serial correlation among residuals. The serial correlation among 
residuals up to the twelfth order is checked using the Ljung-Box Q-statistic. Table 7 reports the 
stationarity tests for all variables used in the reported results. All of them but two are stationary 
                                                 
1 The reported estimations are performed using SAS, STATA and EViews. 
 
at significance level less than 5 percent. The indexes of gross domestic product and gross value 
added (growth rate in percent since corresponding period of previous year) GDPnaiy and 
GVATnaiy are stationary at 7 percent level; however, it is likely due to insufficient power of test 
because of small sample size. 
 
5.2. An interim year of 1998 
The estimated reaction functions become more regular if the first twelve MPC’s 
meetings, from February 1998 through January 1999, are omitted from the sample. For 
example, Table 10 compares the estimations of two specifications for the periods 1998/03-
2002/03 and 1999/02-2002/03: specification 10.1, which includes the month-to-month change in 
the deviation of annual rate of CPIxac less administratively controlled prices from the inflation 
target and exchange rate of zloty to euro, and specification 10.2, which includes two measures 
of current inflation: Ind_CPI_T – an indicator variable, equaled one, when CPI is above the 
inflation target, and zero otherwise, and CPxac_T_YC – the change in the deviation of annual 
rate of core CPI less administratively controlled prices from the inflation target since the date of 
last move in the policy rate. Dropping observations prior to February 1999 results in the 
considerable increase of parameters’ estimates and improvement of fit in both specifications: LR 
(likelihood ratio) is 31.0 vs. 40.2 for model 10.1 and 21.5 vs. 39.3 for model 10.2, count R² 
(proportion of correct predictions) is 0.71 vs. 0.87 and 0.69 vs. 0.95, McKelvey & Zavoina R² is 
0.67 vs. 0.96 and 0.50 vs. 0.97, respectively. 
The detected significant differences in policy behavior before and after February 1999 
can be explained by the following institutional facts. First, the year of 1998 was a period of 
gradual transition (an “interim” year – see Polansky (2004) for more information) from the 
monetary base targeting to a new framework of DIT that was officially declared only in October 
1998 and was formally supposed to be implemented since the beginning of 1999. Second, in 
the middle of 1998 zloty started floating de-facto -- obviously, this switch from the managed to 
floating exchange rate regime affected the conduct of interest rate policy later on. Third, the 
monetary policy in 1998 was complicated by the Russian crisis in August – a strong external 
demand shock, which cut short Polish exports to Russia and boosted the supply in the domestic 
market. The four rate cuts by total amount of 6 percent from September 1998 through January 
1999 were caused to high extent by the Russian default and appear to be the sample outliers. 
Therefore, a sample from 1999/02 through 2006/10 is used for the further estimation. 
 
5.3. Stability of policy responses 
The Andrews’ sup-LR tests with unknown change point detect highly significant 
structural breaks in the year of 2002 for many two-variable specifications, chosen among more 
than hundred and sixty economic indicators from Table 4. For example, Figure 3 shows the plot 
of sup-LR test for the specification with ExInf_T_M (monthly change in the spread between the 
expected rate of inflation over the next 12 months from Ipsos survey and the inflation target) and 
GVARna_Y (the annual growth rate of gross value added in current prices less annual growth 
rate of CPI for the corresponding quarter). The models, including instead of gross value added 
other measures of real activity, such as the real gross domestic product and real domestic 
demand, have the similar patterns of sup-LR tests and also reveal the drastic structural break in 
April 2002. The dating of the structural break precisely matches the cut-off point between the 
discussed above two sub-periods with high and low volatilities of the reference rate changes. 
The separate estimations of four specifications, all including inflationary expectation 
ExInf_T_M, but different measures of real activity for the two sub-periods 1999/02-2002/03 and 
2002/04-2006/10 are reported in Table 8. The difference in the fit before and after April 2002 is 
impressive for all four specifications. For example, for the specification 8.2 with ExInf_T_M and 
GDPRna_Y (the annual growth rate of gross domestic product in current prices less annual 
growth rate of CPI for the corresponding quarter) the LR is 11.97 vs. 75.18, count R² is 0.71 vs. 
0.98 and McKelvey & Zavoina R² is 0.41 vs. 0.97; besides, ExInf_T_M is not significant at 36% 
level prior to April 2002, but significant at 1% level since then. 
Table 9 compares four two-variable models, estimated for both sub-periods separately, 
and all including the same measure of real activity GDPnaiy (the growth rate in percent since 
corresponding period of previous year of the index of gross domestic product), but different 
measures of current or expected inflation. The response to real activity becomes much stronger 
(the parameter estimates are 2-4 times larger) and more systematic in the second sub-period 
(p-values are smaller than 0.01 percent) than in the first one (p-values are between 1 and 7 
percent). The responses to all three measures of current inflation are significant at 5% level in 
both sub-samples. However, the measure of expected inflation ExInf_T_M is not significant at 
17% level prior to April 2002, but significant at 0.1% level later on (see model 9.1). The overall 
fit of all specifications is much better for the second sub-period than for the first one. More 
importantly, Table 9 demonstrates a clear shift from the backward-looking to forward-looking 
policy behavior: the measures of current inflation have far more systematic relationship with the 
policy rate than the inflationary expectation prior to April 2002, but vice versa since then. 
Indeed, the best model for the first sub-period -- the specification 9.4 with the backward-looking 
measure of inflation CPIxac_T_YM (the monthly change in the deviation of annual rate of core 
CPI less administratively controlled prices from the inflation target) -- has much better fit than 
the specification 9.1 with forward-looking measure of inflation (ExInf_T_M): LR is 25.63 vs. 7.81, 
count R² is 0.82 vs. 0.71, McKelvey & Zavoina R² is 0.69 vs. 0.28. Quite the reverse, the best 
model for the second period -- the forward-looking specification 9.1 – definitely outperforms all 
specifications with the measures of current inflation, including the best one among them, the 
specification 9.2 with CPIxmf_T_YM (the monthlychange in the deviation of annual rate of core 
CPI less the most volatile and fuel prices from the inflation target): LR is 69.92 vs. 46.68, count 
R² is 0.91 vs. 0.86, McKelvey & Zavoina R² is 0.91 vs. 0.73. 
 
5.4. Policy reaction prior to April 2002 
Table 10 presents the parameter instability tests for the two two-variable specifications, 
which also reveal the structural break in April 2002. The specification 10.1 includes 
CPIxac_T_YM and Ereu (the exchange rate of zloty to euro). The specification 10.2 contains 
two measures of current inflation: Ind_CPI_T – an indicator variable, equaled one, when CPI is 
above the inflation target, and zero otherwise, and CPxac_T_YC – the change in the deviation 
of annual rate of core CPI less administratively controlled prices from the inflation target since 
the date of last move in the policy rate. Figure 4 also shows the plot of sup-LR test for structural 
change with unknown change point for the model 10.1. The tests detect the structural break in 
April 2002 for both specifications 10.1 and 10.2 at significance levels 1% and 5%, respectively. 
The fit of both models is certainly better for the first sub-period compared to the second one: LR 
is 40.20 vs. 15.17 (for model 10.1) and 39.26 vs. 28.91 (for model 10.2), count R² is 0.87 vs. 
0.62 and 0.95 vs. 0.73, McKelvey & Zavoina R² is 0.96 vs. 0.32 and 0.97 vs. 0.57, respectively. 
The reaction to exchange rate is significant at 1% level prior to April 2002 and not significant at 
9% level since then. The response to current inflation is several times stronger prior to April 
2002 than later on. In the first sub-period both specifications have considerably better fit than 
any model including the inflation and real activity measures from Table 9, and vice versa in the 
second sub-period. 
These results show that in the first sub-period the NBP paid attention mainly to the 
current inflation and reacted to the real activity far less, but to the exchange rate far more 
regular than in the second sub-period. 
 
5.5. Interest rate smoothing? 
The autocorrelation of policy rates is frequently attributed to the intentional interest-rate 
smoothing and intrinsic gradualism of central bank behavior. The empirical estimations of 
central bank reaction functions often treat such a sluggish adjustment of policy rates as 
endogenous to the central bank and incorporate a lagged interest rate on the right-hand side. 
The estimated significant coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is commonly viewed as 
evidence of “monetary policy inertia” or “interest-rate smoothing”, and is explained by the central 
banks conservatism, the dislike of frequent reverses in the direction of interest rates’ changes, 
the desire to reduce the financial-market volatility, the caution caused by the imperfect 
knowledge of current state and structure of economy, and the desire to make the future path of 
short-term interest rates more predictable1. 
Alternatively, the observed partial adjustment of policy rates can be explained by the 
slow cyclical fluctuations of key macroeconomic indicators, such as inflation or output growth, 
which exogenously drive the central bank decisions. For example, Poole (2003) argues that 
there is no partial adjustment: “… future policy actions are almost entirely contingent on the 
arrival of new information.” Moreover, as Rudebusch (2002, 2006) has recently demonstrated, 
the actual real-world amount of endogenous policy inertia is quite low and the illusion of it can 
reflect the mistaken omitting of autocorrelated determinants of policy from the estimated 
reaction function2. 
Is there an evidence for the purposeful inertia of Polish interest-rate policy? The first-
order Pearson correlation coefficients for the reference rate are 0.96 and 0.99 for the periods 
1999/02-2002/03 and 2002/04-2006/10, respectively, while the first-order correlation coefficients 
for the changes to the reference rate are far smaller, 0.11 and 0.54, correspondingly. Table 11 
reports the results of first-order autoregression of the reference rate changes before and after 
April 2002 in the context of ordered probit model (see models 11.1.1 and 11.2.1, respectively). 
The difference is substantial: in the first sub-sample the lagged dependent variable is not 
significant at 34% level, but significant at 1% level in the second one. Thus, the existence of 
partial adjustment in the context of policy rule in differences does not seem to be an issue in the 
first sub-period at all. Not surprisingly, the lagged reference rate changes added to the 
specifications 10.1 and 10.2 (the favored models for the first sub-period) are not significant at 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Amato and Laubach (1999), Bernanke (2004), Brainard (1967), Estrella and Mishkin (1999), 
Goodfriend (1987, 1991), Goodhart (1996, 1999), Levin et al. (1999), Lowe and Ellis (1997), Orphanides 
(2003), Sack (2000), Sack and Wieland (2000), Smets (1998), Woodford (1999b). 
2 See also Castelnuovo (2003, 2006), English et al. (2003), Gerlach-Kristen (2004), Groth and Wheeler 
(2008), Lansing (2002), Sack (2000). 
20% and 40% level, respectively (see models 11.1.2 and 11.1.3). The LR-tests confirm also the 
redundancy of first two lags of dependent variable with p-values 0.07 and 0.26 for specifications 
10.1 and 10.2, respectively.  
Nevertheless, in spite of strong autoregressive property of the reference rate changes 
after April 2002 the lagged reference rate change, added to the specifications 8.2 and 8.3 (the 
favored models for the second sub-periods), is not significant at 56% and 55% level, 
respectively (see models 11.2.2 and 11.2.3). The LR-tests overwhelmingly reject also the 
relevance of two lags of dependent variable with p-values 0.85 and 0.52, respectively. The 
lagged reference rate change does not provide additional explanatory power, when inflation 
expectation and real activity indicator are employed. 
Thus, during the entire period of study the policy rate appears to be driven by the key 
economic variables without evidence for the deliberate interest-rate smoothing by the central 
bank. The observed positive serial correlation of the reference rate changes after April 2002 
arises from the NBP’s systematic responses to persistent shocks in the real sector of economy. 
Indeed, the gross domestic product and gross value added demonstrate strong positive 
autocorrelation -- Pearson correlation coefficients are 0.90 and 0.95 for GDPRna_Y and 
GVATnaiy, respectively. On the contrary, prior to April 2002 the NBP does not react to the real 
activity, but reacts to the changes in the CPI; these changes, however, appear to be less 
autocorrelated -- Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.28 for CPIxac_T_YM. 
 
5.6. Comparison with market anticipation 
How well does the market foresee the decisions on the policy interest rate? As a 
measure of market anticipation I use the forecast of next change to the reference rate from the 
Reuters survey of banks’ analysts in Poland. The survey is conducted two-three times a month 
among 12-22 analysts from commercial banks and usually is updated last time one day prior to 
a MPC’s meeting. Since February 1999 all individual forecasts of next rate’s change have been 
in the range from -200 to 200 basis points. I combine the individual forecasts into three 
categories (“cut”, “no change” and “hike”) to compare them with the models’ predictions. The 
predicted choice is one with the highest predicted probability.  Alternatively, I also use the 
movements in the Warsaw interbank offer rates (WIBOR) employing them as an explanatory 
variable in the ordered probit model. For example, the spread between the WIBOR and 
reference rates at a day prior to an MPC’s policy meeting is assumed to represent the market 
ability to predict MPC’s decisions. 
The market does a good job in anticipating the next monetary policy decisions. Table 
12.1 presents the market anticipation during two sub-periods, prior to and after April 2002. The 
spreads between the 3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-month WIBOR and reference rate predict the policy 
decisions far better than rates with shorter maturities. The 6-month WIBOR demonstrates the 
best likelihood in both sub-samples, predicting correctly 82 and 85 percent of next policy 
decisions with the average likelihood of observed outcomes 77 and 81 percent in the first and 
second sub-periods, respectively. Bank analysts from the Reuters survey foresee 87 and 89 
percent of next policy actions with the average likelihood of observed outcomes 80 and 82 
percent, correspondingly (see Table 12.2).  
However, the predictive power of market anticipation is clearly inferior comparing to the 
models 10.2 (for the first sub-sample) and 8.2 (for the second one): though the model-implied 
forecasts are not optimized with respect to percentage of correct predictions, they predict 95 
and 98 percent of next policy decisions with the average likelihood of observed outcomes 83 
and 90 percent, respectively (see Table 12.2). Even one day before an MPC’s meeting the 
market anticipated the tomorrow policy decision far worse than the estimated simple rules, 
including only two economic indicators, the data on which is generally available for the public 
even earlier! 
 
5.7. Policy reaction after April 2002 
In contrast to the first sub-period, since April 2002 the measures of expected inflation 
and real activity predict the changes in the reference rate better than any other combination of 
economic indicators from Table 4. The further specification tuning for the period 2002/04 – 
2006/10 is performed with the following four categories of dependent variable: “down 0.50%”, 
“down 0.25%”, “no change” and “up 0.25% or 0.50%” with 3, 32, 11 and 9 observations, 
respectively. This quadruple classification depicts the actual policy decisions after April 2002 
almost ideally: only a single 0.25% hike was combined with the two observed 0.50% hikes into a 
joint category. 
Table 14 presents the four models: the specification 14.1 with ExInf_T_M, GDPnaiy and 
ExInf_T_M multiplied by the dummy variable Ind_ExInf_T (equaled one, when the expected 
inflation is above the inflation target, and zero otherwise); the specification 14.2, which in 
addition to the above three variables includes WIBOR12m_ZP (the change since the last MPC’s 
meeting in the 12-month WIBOR if the change is positive, and zero otherwise); and the 
specifications 14.3 and 14.4, which are the same as 14.1 and 14.2, respectively, but instead of 
GDPnaiy they include GVATnaiy (the index of gross value added total, growth rate in percent 
since corresponding period of previous year). 
The NBP appears to respond far aggressively to the spread between the expected 
inflation and inflation target, when the expected inflation is above the target (the coefficient 
estimate is several times bigger). The estimated models 14.1 and 14.3, including only 
inflationary expectation and real activity measures, have remarkable measures of fit: count R² is 
0.91 and McKelvey & Zavoina R² is 0.96 for both models. Adding changes in the 12-month 
WIBOR to the models 14.1 and 14.3 considerably improves the log likelihood from -15.51 to -
7.13 (model 14.2) and from -15.49 to -8.15 (model 14.4), respectively. The models 14.2 and 
14.4 predict correctly 53 and 52 out of 55 policy decisions (forecasting performance – 96% and 
95%), correspondingly. Not only financial markets watch the NBP, but vice versa! Indeed, 
MPC’s press releases indicate that the Council pays attention to the movements in the market 
long-term money rates as an indicator of future inflation. Definitely, changes in the WIBOR 
include extra forecasting information about future inflation not encompassed by the inflationary 
expectation of individual consumers from the Ipsos survey. 
Table 13.1 reports the market anticipations of the reference rate changes, represented 
by the models including the spreads between the 1-, 3-, 6-, 9- and 12-month WIBOR and 
reference rates and estimated by the ordered probit with four categories. The specification 13.3 
with the spread between 6-month WIBOR and reference rates has the best likelihood. Table 
13.2 compares the predictions of next policy decision, implied by the models 14.1 and 14.2, with 
the market anticipation, represented by predictive ability of the movements in the spread 
between 6-month WIBOR and reference rates (model 13.3) and by the forecast from the 
Reuters survey of banks’ analysts. The spread between 6-month WIBOR and reference rates 
and bank analysts predict, respectively, 69 and 84 percent of next policy decisions correctly with 
the average likelihood of observed outcomes 63 and 78 percent and mean absolute error (MAE) 
10.27 and 7.25 basis points, respectively. Noteworthy, the market anticipations are made one 
day prior to an MPC’s meeting. However, the simple model 14.1, based on inflationary 
expectations from the Ipsos survey and GDP, data on which is available for the public much 
earlier than one day prior to a policy meeting, without doubt does better job than the market: it 
predicts correctly 91 percent of next policy actions with average likelihood of observed 
outcomes 84 percent and MAE 4.60 basis points, though once again the ordered probit model is 
not optimized with respect to the proportion of correct predictions. If at a day prior to an MPC’s 
meeting the banks’ analysts accurately paid attention to the movements in the 12-month 
WIBOR in addition to the inflationary expectations from the Ipsos survey and GDP, they would 
be able to predict (see model 14.2 in the Table 13.2) 96 percent of next policy decisions instead 
of 84 percent as they did, making only 2.84 instead of 7.25 basis points MAE with the average 
likelihood of observed outcomes 0.92 instead of 0.78. 
To test again for evidence of deliberate interest-rate smoothing I added the lagged 
dependent variable to the specifications 14.1 and 14.3 (see models 15.1 and 15.2 from Table 
15, respectively). In both cases the lagged rate change is not significant at 50 percent level, at 
least. The LR-tests show the insignificance of adding three lags of dependent variable to both 
models at 5% and 8% level, respectively. The lagged reference rate changes do not provide 
additional explanatory power, when inflation expectation and real activity measure are included 
into the model; though, the reference rate itself and its first difference are autocorrelated with 
correlation coefficient 0.99 and 0.54, respectively. Once again, the observed monetary policy 
inertia does not seem to be a consequence of intentional interest-rate smoothing by the central 
bank. 
All estimated models from Table 14 satisfy the parallel regression assumption with p-
values from 0.17 to 0.37, making superfluous to employ the generalized ordered probit model, 
which is too richly parameterized for our small sample size. To make the further models’ 
diagnostics Table 16 reports the correlograms of generalized residuals1 from models 14.2 and 
14.4: the null of no serial correlation among residuals up to the twelfth order is overwhelmingly 
accepted at least at 60% and 44% level, respectively. It makes unessential to use far more 
computationally demanding dynamic ordered probit approach that accounts for the serial 
correlation among residuals, but cannot be directly estimated by maximizing the likelihood 
function. 
In Figure 5, the upper graph plots the actual and predicted reference rate changes, and 
the lower one plots the actual and expected changes for the specification 14.4. A particular 
policy decision is predicted if its predicted probability exceeds the predicted probabilities of the 
alternatives. The expected changes are computed using the formula E(Y|X) = P(Y=-0.5|X)*(-0.5) 
+ P(Y=-0.25|X)*(-0.25) + P(Y=0|X)*(0) + P(Y>0|X)*(0.5+0.5+0.25)/3, where (0.5+0.5+0.25)/3 = 
E(Y|Y>0, X) – sample mean of “hike” category. The model-implied forecast of discrete policy 
changes is not only very accurate – it predicts correctly 52 out of 55 decisions, but also it is 
made with high degree of certainty: the average likelihood (i.e., the average predicted 
probability of realized outcomes) is 0.91, and the mean absolute error between actual and 
expected policy changes is 3.10 basis points. Figure 6 reports the predicted probabilities of all 
four possible policy actions on the background of the observed changes to the reference rate. 
                                                 
1 The generalized residuals are defined to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables of the model -- 
see Chesher and Irish (1987), and Gourieroux et al. (1987) for details. 
Table 17 compares the actual and predicted policy decisions. The model anticipates all 
rate’s hikes and 50 basis points cuts, and overlooks only two 25 basis points cuts and one no 
change. The ‘adjusted noise-to-signal’ ratios1 for four possible policy actions - ‘hike’, ‘no 
change’, ‘0.25% cut’ and ‘0.50% cut’ – are, correspondingly, 0%, 4.5%, 2.8% and 2.2%. The 
above noise measures are far lower than the reported ones in the related triple-choice (‘hike’, 
‘no change’, and ‘cut’) empirical models for the US Federal Open Market Committee’s decisions 
on the Federal funds rate target. For example, in Hu and Phillips (2004) these ratios for hikes, 
no changes and cuts are 3.8%, 44.6% and 8.5%, while in Piazzesi (2005) they are 10.6%, 
71.8% and not defined, respectively. 
 
5.8. Out-of-sample forecasting 
An out-of-sample forecasting exercise is performed for the period 2006/03 through 
2007/10, including 20 policy decisions of the MPC. The out-of-sample forecasting is compared  
to the market anticipation of policy actions, represented by the probabilities of four possible 
policy choices ("increase", "no change", "0.25% decrease", and "0.50% decrease"), derived 
from the individual forecasts made by commercial banks’ analysts in the Reuters survey one 
day prior to an MPC meeting. In this survey each analyst predicts the most likely level of the 
reference rate to be set at a meeting. The predicted rate’s level can be easily transformed into 
the predicted change; during the period 2006/03 – 2007/10 only two likely outcomes were 
anticipated: either ‘no change’ or ’0.25% hike’. The probability of particular outcome is its 
fraction among all predicted choices. The final prediction is the most popular outcome, i.e. the 
choice with the largest predicted probability. Recently, the banks’ analysts were highly 
successful in forecasting the tomorrow’s policy decision: in the period 2005/07 – 2007/10 they 
anticipated correctly 27 policy actions out of 28; while in the period 2002/04 – 2005/06 only 30 
out of 39. 
Table 18 reports the out-of-sample forecast along with the market anticipation. The out-
of sample predictions are done using specifications 14.3 and 14.4, estimated for the period 
                                                 
1 An ‘adjusted noise-to-signal ratio’, introduced by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), is defined as follows. 
Let A denote the event that the decision is predicted and occurred; let B denote the event that the 
decision is predicted but not occurred; let C denote the event that the decision is not predicted but 
occurred; let D denote the event that the decision is not predicted and not occurred. The desirable 
outcomes fall into categories A and D, while noisy ones fall into categories B and C. A perfect prediction 
would have no entries in B and C, while a noisy prediction would have many entries in B and C, but few in 
A and D. The ‘adjusted noise-to-signal’ ratio is defined as [B/(B+D)]/[A/(A+C)]. 
. 
2002/04 - 2006/02 without rolling re-estimations1. The model 14.3 predicts all seventeen “no 
changes”, making a mistake in the timing of first hike (May instead of April 2007), failing to 
foresee the second hike in June 2007 (predicting it with probability 25% only), and correctly 
forecasting the last hike in August 2007. The model 14.4 predicts all seventeen “no changes” 
and all three hikes, erroneously forecasting only the timing of first hike – May instead of April. 
The market foresees correctly all seventeen “no changes”, but only two of three rate’s hikes, 
overlooking a rate’s increase in June 2007. 
The policy decision in April 2007 appears to be rather atypical. MPC’s press release, 
following the meeting, reports that “according to the April inflation projection, the growth of 
consumer prices will be lower than in the January projection over the whole projection horizon… 
In the Council’s assessment, in the second half of 2007 CPI inflation will temporarily decrease 
markedly below the inflation target of 2.5%.”2 However, despite the decline in NBP’s inflation 
projection, the MPC decided to increase the policy rates, because “in the Council’s assessment, 
in the medium term, the probability of inflation running above the target is larger than the 
probability of its running below the target, which persuaded the Council to tighten the monetary 
policy”. 
MPC’s judgment with respect to the future inflation has been confirmed in the next 
month by an increase in the expected rate of inflation over the next 12 months from the Ipsos 
survey: in May it raised by 0.7% compared to 0.1% in April. Both models predict for May an 
“increase” almost with certainty. However, the rate was not changed in May – the MPC reacted 
preemptively already in April. 
The estimated ex-post policy rules, even those with high measures of in-sample fit, 
generally have quite low out-of-sample forecasting performance, caused by instability of policy 
regime and/or small-sample biasedness of estimation. The conducted out-of sample forecasting 
demonstrates the structural stability of estimated policy reaction up to 20 months ahead, almost 
ideally predicts all policy moves and outperforms the market anticipations, made one day prior 
to each policy meeting. 
 
 
                                                 
1 The models 14.3 and 14.4, estimated over the sub-period 2002/04 – 2006/02, have the following 
measures of fit: LR is 79.55 and 94.73, count R² is 0.89 and 0.96, McKelvey & Zavoina R² is 0.96 and 
0.99. 
2 See NBP (2007). 
6. Does real-time ‘policy-meeting’ data matter? 
 
A common approach to identify the monetary policy rules is to estimate the relationship 
between monthly or quarterly averages of policy rate and economic indicators, using currently 
available for an econometrician data. In reality, the policy decisions are usually made 8-12 times 
per year, and the policymakers react to the incoming original non-aggregated data, as it was 
known at a day of policy meeting. By and large, the information set used in the policy-making 
process may differ from one used by the econometrician thanks to three reasons: data 
revisions, inaccurate aligning the timing of data releases and policy decisions, and time 
aggregation. 
This section assesses the statistical effects of using the ex post revised and time-
aggregated data on the empirical identification of Polish monetary policy. The policy rules, 
estimated using the real-time data and decision-making meetings as a unit of observation, are 
compared with the rules, estimated using the currently available data at monthly frequency. 
Since the policy-making meetings have taken place every month and only once per month 
during the sample period, the two data sets – the real-time “MPC-meeting” data set, which 
mimics as much as possible the true information set used in the policy-making process, and the 
ex post revised monthly data set used by the econometrician – have the same number of 
observations. Moreover, they have absolutely the same values of dependent variable – monthly 
changes to the reference rate. It allows applying the same regression technique (an ordered 
probit) for estimation of alternative policy rules, and provides a straightforward way to compare 
them. However, the values of right-hand-side variables in two data sets are in general not the 
same. Therefore, we will determine whether these discrepancies can lead to statistically 
different inference. 
How to align the timing of left- and right-hand side variables in the revised monthly data 
set? We can apply the same assumption for all variables in the data set by allowing, say, a 
month lag in arriving of monthly statistical data, i.e. we can match the reference rate change in a 
given month with the values of independent variables for a previous month. However, to give 
the revised averaged data the best chance to match the data truly available for policymakers I 
use such a lag length that is typical for a given series. For example: inflationary expectation 
from the Ipsos survey is usually available for a current month, without a lag; CPI is typically 
available for a previous month, i.e. with a month lag; the quarterly data on GDP and 
components is usually released with a two-month lag. 
The estimations of the same four specifications as in Table 14 are performed for both 
data sets for the period 2002/04 – 2006/10 using ordered probit model with four categories of 
dependent variable: "0.50% or 0.25% increase", "no change", "0.25% decrease", and "0.50% 
decrease". Table 19 reports the policy rules’ estimations based on the ex post revised monthly 
data. The differences between the estimations, using the real-time and revised data sets, are in 
favor of the real-time one: for the specifications 14.1 and 14.3 log likelihood lowers from -15.51 
and -15.49 (see Table 14) to -18.20 and -17.24 (see Table 19), and the percentage of correctly 
predicted outcomes decreases by 6% and 4%, respectively. The time-aggregation effect is not 
strong in this case, because during the period of study the MPC have always taken policy 
decisions at the second half of each month after all major statistical releases, including 
inflationary expectations and GDP. All regressors remain highly significant, and parameters’ 
estimates are not statistically different. Such results are not surprising: these models are based 
on two indicators, released monthly: inflationary expectation measure, which is never revised, 
and GDP index, which is only slightly revised. The observed difference in goodness-of-fit is, 
however, caused mainly by these minor revisions.  
The difference drastically changes for the specifications 14.2 and 14.4, which contain an 
extra variable WIBOR12m_ZP: the log likelihood drops from -7.13 and -8.15 to -18.4 and           
-17.22, the percentage of correctly predicted outcomes decreases by 11% and 8%, respectively. 
The coefficient on WIBOR12m_ZP becomes highly insignificant with the revised monthly data 
(p-values are 0.72 and 0.82 for specifications 14.2 and 14.4, respectively), while being 
significant at 3% level with the real-time data. These results are not surprising either: though the 
data on WIBOR is never revised, the calendar month averaging overlooks the critical 
information about the movements in the WIBOR between MPC’s meetings and in the days 
around them. 
 Table 20 compares the estimation performed using the two alternative data sets for the 
specification including ExInf_T_M, GDPRna_Y, and ExInf_T_M*Ind_ExInf_T: the use of revised 
monthly data decreases the log likelihood from -19.04 to -29.48, and lowers the percentage of 
correctly predicted outcomes by 9%. Now the differences in the goodness-of-fit are far larger 
than for the specifications 14.1 and 14.3, including GDPnaiy and GVATnaiy instead of 
GDPRna_Y, respectively. Indeed, the difference between the real-time and revised versions of 
GDPRna_Y is more substantial: the correlation coefficient between the latest revised vintage of 
GDPRna_Y and its real-time version is 0.72, while for both GDPnaiy and GVATnaiy the 
correlation is about 0.99. 
Thus, despite the facts that the degree of ex post revisions of statistical data in Poland is 
quite low and the policy-making meetings take place regularly in the second half of each month, 
which diminish the difference between the two alternative sample constructions, the real-time 
data set with the decision-making meetings of monetary authority as a unit of observation is 
shown to produce statistically different estimation results with better measures of fit. The 
calendar month averages are not capable in detecting the strong systematic relationship 
between intermeeting changes in the daily financial market data (closely monitored by the 
central bank) and policy rate changes. 
The use of real-time data set with the policy-making meetings as a unit of observation 
does matter in the econometric identification of Polish monetary policy! 
 
7. Does discreteness matter? 
 
The used ordered probit model (OP) elegantly accounts for the discreteness of policy 
rate and impact of explanatory variables. However, can we address the above problems by the 
conventional simpler linear regression model (LR)? This section compares the performance of 
OP and LR in order to show that using special regression methods for a discrete dependent 
variable does make difference in the econometric identification of Polish monetary policy.  
Such comparison is complicated because the OP, based on the maximum likelihood 
(ML), is designed to estimate the probabilities of limited discrete outcomes of dependent 
variable while the LR, based on the ordinary least squares (OLS), is designed to estimate the 
expected value of dependent variable, which is assumed to be an unlimited continuous one. 
Therefore, all measures of fit for the LR (such as the coefficient of determination R2, etc) cannot 
be constructed for the OP, because they are based on the OLS, and cannot be directly 
compared with the pseudo R2 measures of fit for the OP, since they are all based on the ML. 
It is appealing to estimate the LR by ML as a generalized linear model (GLM) with 
identity link function and normal probability distribution, and compare it with the OP using some 
kind of test for non-nested models, for instance, Santos Silva’s test (Silva, 2001), based on the 
likelihood. However, the comparison of GLM and OP on the basis of the likelihood is still not 
legitimate. The problem is with the likelihood per se: the likelihood functions of GLM and OP 
have different nature. In the OP (as in other models for a categorical dependent variable) the 
individual observation’s contribution to the likelihood is the probability to observe the realized 
discrete event, while in the GLM the likelihood is not the probability (the integral under the PDF 
between two cut-points), but the value of the continuous normal PDF at some point (hence, it 
can be greater than one). 
Unfortunately, it seems impossible to construct a formal test based on the likelihood to 
compare the LR and OP. Are there any other appropriate ways to compare them? One possible 
approach is to define the expected value of dependent variable E(Y|X) for the OP and compare 
it with the LR counterpart. For the LR the E(Y|X) = X*b, where coefficients b are estimated by 
OLS or ML; for the OP we can naturally assume that  the E(Y|X) = Pr(Y=-0.5|X)*(-0.5) + Pr(Y=-
0.25|X)*(-0.25) + Pr(Y=0|X)*(0) + Pr(Y>0|X)*(0.5+0.5+0.25)/3, where probabilities are estimated 
by ML1. Then we can calculate, for example, the mean absolute error, i.e. the arithmetic 
average of absolute differences between the observed and expected rate’s changes (denoted 
as “MAE of E(Y|X)”). 
An alternative approach is to compute the conditional distribution of rate changes by 
defining the probabilities of discrete events for the LR and compare them with the OP 
counterparts. Let us ignore for a moment the discreteness of policy rate and evaluate the 
following simple LR using OLS: 
ΔRRt = Xtβ + εt                                                            (5) 
where ΔRRt – the reference rate change, Xt - vector of explanatory variables, and εt – 
disturbance term, assumed to be normal iid (0, σ²). We can define the probabilities of discrete 
outcomes of ΔRRt as follows: 
Pr (ΔRRt  = -0.50)   =  Pr (-∞ <  Xtβ + εt < c1) 
Pr (ΔRRt  = -0.25)   =  Pr (c1  ≤  Xtβ + εt < c2) 
Pr (ΔRRt  =  0.00)   =  Pr (c2  ≤  Xtβ + εt < c3) 
 Pr (ΔRRt >= 0.25)   =  Pr (c3  ≤  Xtβ + εt < ∞), 
where  -∞ < c1 < c2 < c3 < ∞ are some known fixed cut-points. 
These probabilities can be obtained using the normal cumulative distribution function F 
of εt and estimated OLS coefficients β as follows: 
 
                                                 
1 The E(Y|Y>0,X) is taken to be equal (0.5+0.5+0.25)/3, which is the sample mean. 
Pr (ΔRRt  = -0.50)  =  Pr (-∞ - Xtβ <  εt < c1 - Xtβ) = F(c1 - Xtβ) 
Pr (ΔRRt  = -0.25)  =  Pr (c1 - Xtβ  ≤  εt < c2 - Xtβ) = F(c2 - Xtβ) - F(c1 - Xtβ)                     (6) 
Pr (ΔRRt  =  0.00)  =  Pr (c2 - Xtβ  ≤  εt < c3 - Xtβ)  = F(c3 - Xtβ) - F(c2 - Xtβ) 
   Pr (ΔRRt >= 0.25)  =  Pr (c3 - Xtβ  ≤  εt < ∞ - Xtβ)  = 1 - F(c3 - Xtβ) 
 Let us refer to such a LR, extended to estimate the probabilities of discrete events, as to 
a ‘rounded linear regression’ model (RLR). To compute the probabilities in (6) we just have to 
choose the values of cut-points. 
The probabilities of discrete outcomes for the RLR in (6) can be now contrasted to the 
corresponding probabilities for the OP in (3). For example, we can compute and compare the 
percentage of correctly predicted outcomes, where the predicted outcome is the outcome with 
the highest probability (denoted as ‘Count R²’), the proportion of correct predictions beyond the 
number that would be correctly guessed by choosing the outcome category with the largest 
percentage of observed cases (denoted as ‘Adjusted count R²’), and the average predicted 
probability of realized outcomes, i.e. the average likelihood of individual observations (denoted 
as ‘Average likelihood’). 
The above measures of fit are useful in comparing competing models, but can provide 
only a rough guidance in selecting the preferred model. Without doing a formal test, however, it 
is unclear which model is the best one. Formal comparison of LP and OP can be done by noting 
that the RLR is actually a special case of OP. 
Indeed, the formulas (6) are identical to ones for a censored interval regression model 
(also known as a ‘grouped regression’ model), which is defined by (1)-(4) like the OP, but with 
the fixed cut-points cj instead of estimated αj and estimated σ2 = Var(εt|X) instead of assumed to 
be equal to one. The interval regression model (IR) can be estimated by maximizing the log 
likelihood function lnL of β and σ: 
Ln L = ∑t ∑j  dtj ln [F(cj - Xtβ) - F(cj-1 - Xtβ)],                                   (7) 
where in our case j = 1, 2, 3, 4; t = 1, 2, …, N; N  is the sample size; dtj = 1 if ΔRRt = kj and 0 
otherwise; [k1, k2, k3, k4] = [‘-0.5%’, ‘-0.25%’, ‘0%’, ‘0.25% or 0.5%’] – four categories of the 
reference rate changes; and F is the normal cumulative distribution function with mean zero and 
variance σ2. 
 The probabilities of discrete events in the IR and RLR, though given by the same 
formulas (6), are in general different, because in the RLR the β and σ2 are estimated by 
minimizing the squares of residuals from the model (5), while in the IR the β and σ are 
estimated by maximizing the log likelihood (7) from the model (1). Yet, the probabilities and 
likelihood, defined respectively by (6) and (7), for the RLR are identical to ones for the IR, if β 
and σ2 in the IR are constrained to be equal to the OLS estimates from the LR instead of being 
estimated by maximizing (7). In this respect our extended RLR is a special case of IR. 
Furthermore, the IR itself is actually nested in the OP, since we can treat the OP as a more 
general model, in which the assumption of fixed thresholds is relaxed (so the thresholds have to 
be estimated) and the intercept β0 and Var(εt|X) are fixed to be the same as they have been 
estimated in the IR (as a rule, Var(εt|X) and β0 in the OP are assumed to be equal to one and 
zero, respectively, but these identifying assumptions are arbitrary and affect only the slope 
coefficients in β – they do not affect the estimated probabilities and likelihood). 
Thus, the IR is nested in the OP, if Var(εt|X) and β0 in the OP are assumed to be equal to 
their counterparts from the IR. Consequently, all three models -- the RLR, which is equivalent to 
the constrained IR with the βLR and σ2LR, the unconstrained IR, and the OP with Var(εt|X) = σ2IR 
and β0 = β0(IR) -- are nested inside each other, can be estimated by ML and, hence, may be 
compared using, for example, the likelihood ratio chi-square test1. 
 Table 21 presents the two LRs, estimated for the period 2002/04 – 2006/10 by OLS with 
the same specifications as in the OP models 14.3 and 14.4, using the historical (not classified) 
values of the reference rate changes. The coefficients of determination are about 0.68, and the 
coefficients of ExInf_T_M and GVATnaiy are significant at 1% level for both specifications. 
However, in contrast to the OP, in the specification 14.3 the LR coefficient of 
ExInf_T_M*Ind_ExInf_T is not significant at 24% level, and in the specification 14.4 both the 
coefficients of ExInf_T_M*Ind_ExInf_T and WIBOR12m_ZP are not significant at 29% and 61% 
level, respectively, while all being significant in both OP specifications at 2% level at most. 
These results send the preliminary signal about incapability of LR to be an adequate substitute 
to OP. 
 Table 22 compiles the goodness-of-fit measures of two specifications 14.3 and 14.4, 
obtained for estimations in the context of RLR (which is equivalent to the constrained IR with all 
coefficients β and σ² restricted to be the OLS ones from the LR), unconstrained IR and OP. The 
RLRs are estimated using four alternative sets of fixed cut-points: biased-toward-tightening       
[-0.5, -0.25, 0], biased-toward-easing [-0.25, 0, 0.25], equally-spaced [-0.375, -0.125, 0.125] and 
zero-inflated [-0.5, -0.25, 0.25]. The RLRs have practically the same likelihood and other 
measures of fit for both specifications, being unable (like the LR) to detect the predictive power 
                                                 
1 See Hausman et al. (1992) for the related comparison of LR estimated by OLS and OP in this context. 
They set up the extended ‘rounded’ version of LR as a special case of OP, in which all the thresholds are 
fixed and equally spaced, and apply the Wald chi-square test to check this restrictions. This is the only 
known to me example of formal testing of the LR against the OP in the literature. 
of additional variable WIBOR12m_ZP. The RLRs with equally-spaced and zero-inflated 
thresholds predict correctly 78 and 73 percent of observed rate’s changes and have very similar 
log likelihood (about -36) and MAE (about 10 basis points); their fit is considerably higher than 
the fit of RLRs with the other two sets of thresholds, biased-toward-tightening and biased-
toward-easing, where the percent of correct predictions is about 55 and 43, the log likelihood is 
about -55 and -52, and MAE is about 17 and 14 basis points, respectively. The equally-spaced 
and zero-inflated thresholds seem to be rather reasonable assumptions: the RLRs have 
practically the same MAE as the LR (about 10 basis points), while biased-toward-tightening and 
biased-toward-easing cut-points lead to larger MAE than the LR’s one. 
 The estimations of unconstrained IR are reported only for the equally-spaced and zero-
inflated thresholds1. The likelihood maximization in the IR with the equally-spaced cut-points 
produces the similar estimates of intercept and slope coefficients for ExInf_T_M and GVATnaiy 
as in the RLR model (for instance, for the specification 14.4 they are (standard errors are in 
parentheses), respectively, -0.381 (0.041), 0.201 (0.058), and 0.079 (0.011) in the LR and -
0.367 (0.031), 0.202 (0.046), and 0.074 (0.009) in the RLR) and the same 10 basis points MAE, 
but triples the size and considerably improves the significance of slope coefficients for 
ExInf_T_M*Ind_ExInf_T and WIBOR12m_ZP (p-values are 0.291 and 0.619 in the RLR versus 
0.004 and 0.107 in the IR, respectively), and increases the log likelihood from -36.2 to -29.7. 
Moreover, in the IR with zero-inflated thresholds the likelihood maximization alters the estimates 
of intercept and all four slope coefficients for ExInf_T_M, GVATnaiy, ExInf_T_M*Ind_ExInf_T 
and WIBOR12m_ZP: -0.381 (0.041), 0.201 (0.058), 0.079 (0.011), 0.106 (0.099) and 0.058 
(0.115) in the RLR versus -0.530 (0.029), 0.275 (0.052), 0.101 (0.009), 0.508 (0.106) and 0.424 
(0.115) in the IR, respectively. It also makes all coefficients to be significant at the level less 
than 1%, increases the log likelihood from -36.16 to -15.58, and reduces the MAE from 10 to 5 
basis points. In contrast to the RLR, the ML estimation of IR reveals a large difference between 
the specifications with equally-spaced and zero-inflated cut-points. The zero-inflated thresholds, 
where the distance between the cut-points in the “no change” category is twice bigger than in 
the “-0.25% decrease” category, result in considerable improvement of fit, compared to the 
equally-spaced ones, where these distances are the same: the log likelihood is -15.58 versus -
29.70, and the MAE is 5 versus 10 basis points. 
Finally, the OP demonstrates the further sharp improvement of fit, compared to the RLR and 
IR: for example, in the specification 14.4 the log likelihood raises to -8.2 (versus -36.2 and -15.6 
                                                 
1 The IR estimations with the biased-toward-tightening and biased-toward-easing sets of cut-points have 
only different intercept estimates, but produce the same slope coefficients, probabilities and likelihood as 
with the equally-spaced cut-points, because all three sets have the same distances between adjacent cut-
points and differ among themselves by a 12.5 basis points parallel shift. 
for the RLR and IR, respectively), the MAE drops to 3 basis points (versus 10 and 5, 
respectively), the proportion of correct predictions reaches 95% (versus 78% and 87%). The OP 
model seems to more adequately reflect the central bank reluctance to move the policy rate by 
allowing the underlying continuous rate changes and estimated cut-points to have the different 
scale with the observed discrete changes. In our case, the OP model estimates the distance 
between the cut-points for the “no change” category to be almost four times bigger than for the 
“-0.25% decrease” category in both specifications. 
To formally compare the OP, IR and RLR, estimated with the same data set for two 
specifications, Table 22 reports the results of likelihood ratio chi-square tests of several versions 
of RLR and IR with alternative sets of cut-points against a more general unconstrained OP 
model that nests all the above ones. All tests are in favor of the OP: imposed by the null 
hypothesis constraints are rejected at marginal 7% significance level only for one model, the IR 
with the specification 14.3 and zero-inflated cut-points, while for all other models they are 
overwhelmingly rejected at less than 1% level. 
Thus, not only does the OP model reveal considerably better measures of fit than the RLR 
and IR models, but also it is clearly superior on the basis of formal statistical test. The 
information gained by a more complex discrete-response technique like OP is not attainable 
with the simpler continuous-response linear regression techniques. 
Discreteness does matter! 
 
8. Summary and conclusions 
 
“It is highly desirable that policy practice be formalized to the 
maximum possible extent. Or, more precisely, monetary economists 
should embark on a program of continuous improvement and 
enhanced precision of the Fed’s monetary rule…” 
-- W. Poole, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis1 
 
The aim of this study is not to describe the current practice of Polish monetary policy by 
an algebraic equation, or “rule”. Rather, the paper lets the data speak in support of the 
statement that the policy decisions are highly predictable by observing the arriving economic 
                                                 
1 See Poole (2006). 
and financial news in the real-time setting and using an appropriate econometric technique. 
Though the NBP looks at everything in formulating policy decisions, the estimated reaction 
functions, based on a small number of economic variables, explain correctly 95 percent of 
observed discrete policy adjustments in the period 1999/02 – 2006/10. In an out-of-sample 
forecasting of next twenty monthly policy decisions from 2006/03 through 2007/10 the empirical 
model correctly predicts seventeen ‘no changes’ and three ‘hikes’, erroneously forecasting only 
the timing of one hike with a monthly lag. Such forecasting performance surpasses the market 
anticipations of next policy move, made one day prior to a policy meeting. The market 
(represented by the Reuters survey of banks’ analysts) predicted correctly only 84 percent of 
policy-rate decisions in the period 1999/02 – 2006/10 and overlooked one hike in the period 
2006/03 – 2007/10. 
The reported in- and out-of-sample forecasting performance, exceeding the typical one 
in the literature, is shown to be (at least, partially) a consequence of employed empirical 
methodology, combining the use of regression techniques for a discrete dependent variable, 
real-time data and decision-making meetings of monetary authority as a unit of observation. 
This methodological framework carefully mimics the actual policy-action-generating process 
since: (i) most major central banks alter interest rates by discrete-valued adjustments, (ii) policy 
decisions are naturally made using information available in the real-time setting, and (iii) they 
are typically made 8-12 times per year at special policy-making meetings. However, the 
empirical studies routinely estimate the monetary policy rules by (i) applying the regression 
methods for a continuous dependent variable, (ii) using currently available series of economic 
data, and (iii) analyzing the systematic responses of policy rate’s averages to economic data 
averages for a given month or quarter. Obviously, such practice distorts the actual data-
generating process because: (i) regression methods for a continuous dependent variable are 
shown to be inadequate when the dependent variable is discrete, (ii) the latest versions of 
statistical data may differ from the real-time ones due to revisions, and (iii) time aggregation of 
data misaligns the timing of policy decisions and availability of statistical data as well as raises 
the problem of simultaneity. 
On the other hand, it is not apparent that these distortions are significant enough to 
make a difference from practical point of view, i.e. in the econometric identification of monetary 
policy rules. This issue has been only partially analyzed in the literature. It was demonstrated for 
several countries that ex post revised and real-time data lead to significantly different estimation 
results. There were only a few studies that model the policy rules using a discrete choice 
approach. To the best of my knowledge, there were no attempts to assess how the use of 
discrete regression techniques affects the empirical identification of monetary policy; neither 
were there the attempts to estimate the policy rules using the decision-making meetings of 
monetary authority as a unit of observation. 
This study assesses separately the statistical effects of using the linear OLS regression 
model instead of ordered probit one and the latest revised monthly-averaged data instead of 
real-time one with the policy-making meetings as a unit of observation. The formal comparison 
shows that discreteness and real-time data do matter in the empirical identification of Polish 
monetary policy.  
The performed ordered probit analysis of response patterns between the reference rate 
changes and incoming economic real-time data reveals briefly the following:  
o The first twelve policy decisions of the MPC prior to February 1999 (during an 
interim period of transition to a new policy regime) significantly differ from the regular policy 
reactions since then. 
o The systematic policy responses demonstrate remarkable structural differences 
prior to and since April 2002. In its reaction to the deviation of inflation from the target the NBP 
has shifted from the backward- to forward-looking behaviour. 
o Prior to April 2002, in the period of fighting the high inflation the NBP reacted to 
the real activity measures far less, but to the exchange rate far more regular than since then, in 
the period of stabilizing the low inflation. 
o The NBP reacts highly asymmetrically to the changes in inflationary 
expectations, depending on whether the expected inflation is above or below the inflation target. 
o The policy rates appear to be driven by the key economic indicators without 
evidence for deliberate interest-rate smoothing by the central bank. 
The proposed methodological framework is well suited to identify the monetary policy of 
many central banks and can help market participants to minimize the uncertainty about future 
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Notes:  Dependent variable: reference rate change; Independent variables: GVARna_Y and ExInf_T_M; 
Model: Ordered probit with three categories: 'up', 'no change', 'down'; Sample 1999/02 - 2006/10. 
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Notes: The ordered probit estimations are performed for the specification 14.4 with four categories of 
dependent variable - change to the reference rate: ‘hike’, ‘no change’, ‘0.25% cut’ and ‘0.50% cut’. A 
particular choice is predicted if its predicted probability exceeds the predicted probabilities of the 
alternatives. If a ‘hike’ is predicted, it is shown as a (0.5+0.5+0.25)/3 increase. The expected changes are 
computed using formula: E(Y|X) = P(Y=-0.5|X)*(-0.5) + P(Y=-0.25|X)*(-0.25) + P(Y=0|X)*(0) + 
P(Y>0|X)*(0.5+0.5+0.25)/3, where (0.5+0.5+0.25)/3 = E(Y|Y>0, X) – sample mean of “hike” category. 
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Note: The ordered probit estimations are performed for the specification 14.4. 
TABLE 1. 
Summary of empirical literature on Polish monetary policy rules 
Study Sample Dependent variable Estimation method 
Data 




2003:Q2 Short-term market rate OLS quarterly 
The CPI, the deviation of the real GDP from the 
potential one, the first difference and lagged level of 
the dependent variable 
The output gap is significant (at 10%) only prior 







domestic & foreign 
short-term market rates 
VAR, 
3-stage OLS quarterly 
The lagged dependent variable, and expected 
deviation of domestic inflation from the foreign one 
The output gap (capacity utilization ratio) is not 





2004:12 Treasury bill rate 
Bayesian 
SVAR monthly 





2000 The reference rate SVAR, OLS monthly 
The inflation rate, and rate of growth of real credit to 
non-financial sector   
Kokoszczyński 
et al. (2006) 
1995:01-
2002:12 1-month WIBOR SVAR, GMM monthly 
The log of price level, industrial output (deviation from 
the trend), and money aggregate M1 
The policy is evaluated using Bernanke-Mihov 





Change of policy bias 




The deviations of CPI, industrial production and 
nominal exchange rate EUR/PLN from their 
expectations, and growth rate of real exchange rate 
EUR/PLN   
The reaction functions are estimated individually 
for all MPC’s members. 





Linear combination of 
1-month WIBOR and 
exchange rate 
Bayesian 
SVAR monthly The CPI, industrial production index and EMBI+ 
The model allows for a limited time-variation of 
parameters with the switch in February 1998 
1995-





GMM monthly The expected CPI and output gap, and lagged dependent variable 
The real effective exchange rate is not 
significant; the response to negative inflation 
shock is stronger than to positive one (Poland is 





2002:02 1- and 3-month WIBOR SVAR, OLS monthly 
The CPI (the only variable significant for the whole sample), broad money M2 (losing its role after 1997), 
lagged nominal effective exchange rate (gradually losing its role while becoming more and more freely 
floating), current account deficit with respect to GDP (strengthening its role after 1996), lagged credit to the 
non-financial sector or deposits of private individuals (having a primary role before 2000 and then 
gradually replaced by the industrial output gap) 
 
TABLE 2. 
















1998-02-25 24.00 0.50 2002-07-19 8.50 0.00 
1998-03-18 24.00 0.00 2002-08-28 8.00 -0.50 
1998-04-22 23.00 -1.00 2002-09-25 7.50 -0.50 
1998-05-20 21.50 -1.50 2002-10-23 7.00 -0.50 
1998-06-17 21.50 0.00 2002-11-27 6.75 -0.25 
1998-07-16 19.00 -2.50 2002-12-18 6.75 0.00 
1998-08-19 19.00 0.00 2003-01-29 6.50 -0.25 
1998-09-09 18.00 -1.00 2003-02-26 6.25 -0.25 
1998-10-28 17.00 -1.00 2003-03-26 6.00 -0.25 
1998-11-18 17.00 0.00 2003-04-24 5.75 -0.25 
1998-12-09 15.50 -1.50 2003-05-28 5.50 -0.25 
1999-01-20 13.00 -2.50 2003-06-25 5.25 -0.25 
1999-02-17 13.00 0.00 2003-07-18 5.25 0.00 
1999-03-24 13.00 0.00 2003-08-27 5.25 0.00 
1999-04-21 13.00 0.00 2003-09-30 5.25 0.00 
1999-05-27 13.00 0.00 2003-10-29 5.25 0.00 
1999-06-16 13.00 0.00 2003-11-26 5.25 0.00 
1999-07-21 13.00 0.00 2003-12-17 5.25 0.00 
1999-08-18 13.00 0.00 2004-01-21 5.25 0.00 
1999-09-22 14.00 1.00 2004-02-25 5.25 0.00 
1999-10-20 14.00 0.00 2004-03-31 5.25 0.00 
1999-11-17 16.50 2.50 2004-04-27 5.25 0.00 
1999-12-15 16.50 0.00 2004-05-26 5.25 0.00 
2000-01-26 16.50 0.00 2004-06-30 5.75 0.50 
2000-02-23 17.50 1.00 2004-07-28 6.00 0.25 
2000-03-29 17.50 0.00 2004-08-25 6.50 0.50 
2000-04-26 17.50 0.00 2004-09-29 6.50 0.00 
2000-05-24 17.50 0.00 2004-10-27 6.50 0.00 
2000-06-21 17.50 0.00 2004-11-24 6.50 0.00 
2000-07-19 17.50 0.00 2004-12-15 6.50 0.00 
2000-08-30 19.00 1.50 2005-01-26 6.50 0.00 
2000-09-19 19.00 0.00 2005-02-25 6.50 0.00 
2000-10-25 19.00 0.00 2005-03-30 6.00 -0.50 
2000-11-29 19.00 0.00 2005-04-27 5.50 -0.50 
2000-12-20 19.00 0.00 2005-05-25 5.50 0.00 
2001-01-22 19.00 0.00 2005-06-29 5.00 -0.50 
2001-02-28 18.00 -1.00 2005-07-27 4.75 -0.25 
2001-03-28 17.00 -1.00 2005-08-31 4.50 -0.25 
2001-04-26 17.00 0.00 2005-09-28 4.50 0.00 
2001-05-30 17.00 0.00 2005-10-26 4.50 0.00 
2001-06-27 15.50 -1.50 2005-11-30 4.50 0.00 
2001-07-20 15.50 0.00 2005-12-21 4.50 0.00 
2001-08-22 14.50 -1.00 2006-01-31 4.25 -0.25 
2001-09-26 14.50 0.00 2006-02-28 4.00 -0.25 
2001-10-25 13.00 -1.50 2006-03-29 4.00 0.00 
2001-11-28 11.50 -1.50 2006-04-26 4.00 0.00 
2001-12-19 11.50 0.00 2006-05-31 4.00 0.00 
2002-01-30 10.00 -1.50 2006-06-28 4.00 0.00 
2002-02-27 10.00 0.00 2006-07-26 4.00 0.00 
2002-03-27 10.00 0.00 2006-08-30 4.00 0.00 
2002-04-26 9.50 -0.50 2006-09-27 4.00 0.00 
2002-05-29 9.00 -0.50 2006-10-25 4.00 0.00 
2002-06-26 8.50 -0.50    
 
Notes: * Dates of taking the policy decisions 
____________________________ 
SOURSE: National Bank of Poland 
 
TABLE 3.1. 
Frequency distribution of historical changes to the reference rate 
Frequency 
Amount of 









2.50 1  1 
1.50 1  1 
1.00 2  2 
0.50 1 2 3 
0.25  1 1 
0.00 31 32 63 
-0.25  11 11 
-0.50  9 9 
-1.00 6  6 
-1.50 6  6 
-2.50 2  2 
Total: 50 55 105 
 
TABLE 3.2. 














increase 5 3 8 
no change 31 32 63 
decrease 14 20 34 
Total: 50 55 105 
 
TABLE 3.3. 
Frequency distribution of consolidated changes to the reference rate 




no change 32 
0.25% decrease 11 




SOURSE: National Bank of Poland and author’s compilations 
TABLE 4. 
Real-time “MPC-meeting" data set 


































Consumer price index CPI M nsa GUS 9 
Consumer price index, excl. administratively controlled prices CPIxac M nsa GUS & NBP 8 
Consumer price index, excl. the most volatile prices CPIxmv M nsa GUS & NBP 8 
Consumer price index, excl. the most volatile and fuel prices CPIxmvf M nsa GUS & NBP 8 
Consumer price index, excl. food and fuel prices CPIxff M nsa GUS & NBP 8 
Consumer price index, 15% trimmed mean CPItri M nsa GUS & NBP 8 
Business tendency survey in retail trade - Prices of sold goods BTSRspr M nsa GUS 11 
Inflationary expectations 
Expected annual rate of CPI over next 12 months, percent ExInf M nsa Ipsos & NBP 4 
CPI forecast by banking analysts by the end of the year, annual rate in percent ReuCPI_Dec M nsa Reuters 4 
CPI forecast by banking analysts over next 11 months, annual rate in percent ReuCPI_11m M nsa Reuters 4 
CPI forecast by banking analysts for the previous month, annual rate in percent ReuCPI_prm M nsa Reuters 4 
CPI average annual rate forecast by banking analysts for the next year, percent ReuCPI_nya M nsa Reuters 4 
PPI forecast by banking analysts for the previous month, annual rate in percent ReuPPI_prm M nsa Reuters 4 
PPI forecast by banking analysts over next 11 months, annual rate in percent ReuPPI_11m M nsa Reuters 4 
CPI central projection by NBP for the current quarter, annual rate  in percent NBP_CPI_cq Q nsa 
CPI central projection by NBP for the next quarter, annual rate in percent NBP_CPI_1q Q nsa 
CPI central projection by NBP over next two quarters, annual rate in percent NBP_CPI_2q Q nsa 
CPI central projection by NBP over next three quarters, annual rate in percent NBP_CPI_3q Q nsa 
CPI central projection by NBP over next four quarters, annual rate in percent NBP_CPI_4q Q nsa 
CPI central projection by NBP over next five quarters, annual rate in percent NBP_CPI_5q Q nsa 
CPI central projection by NBP over next six quarters, annual rate in percent NBP_CPI_6q Q nsa 
CPI central projection by NBP over next seven quarters, annual rate in percent NBP_CPI_7q Q nsa 
CPI central projection by NBP over next eight quarters, annual rate in percent NBP_CPI_8q Q nsa 
CPI inflation 
projections, published 
in the NBP’s Inflation 
Reports since August 
2004. Since 2006 
they are prepared for 
MPC’s meetings in 
January, April, July 
and October 
Business tendency survey in industry - Expected selling prices of products BTSIerpr M nsa GUS 11 
Business tendency survey in retail trade - Expected prices of goods BTSRepr M nsa GUS 11 
Gross domestic product and main components 
Domestic demand, current prices, bln PLN Demna Q nsa GUS 3 
Final consumption expenditure of households, current prices, bln PLN FCEhna Q nsa GUS 3 
Gross domestic product, current prices, bln PLN GDPna Q nsa GUS 3 
Gross fixed capital formation, current prices, bln PLN GFCFna Q nsa GUS 3 
Gross value added, current prices, bln PLN GVAna Q nsa GUS 3 
Index of domestic demand, growth rate in percent since corresponding period of previous year Demnaiy Q nsa GUS 3 
Index of final consumption expenditure of households, growth rate in percent since corresponding period 
of previous year FCEhnaiy Q nsa GUS 3 
Index of gross domestic product, growth rate in percent since corresponding period of previous year GDPnaiy Q nsa GUS 3 
Index of  gross fixed capital formation, growth rate in percent since corresponding period of previous year GFCFnaiy Q nsa GUS 3 
Index of gross value added, total, growth rate in percent since corresponding period of previous year GVATnaiy Q nsa GUS 3 
Annual growth rate of gross domestic product less annual growth rate of CPI, percent GDPRna_Y Q nsa GUS 3 
Annual growth rate of gross value added less annual growth rate of CPI, percent GVARna_Y Q nsa GUS 3 
Other measures of real activity 
Business tendency survey in construction - General economic situation BTSCges M nsa GUS 11 
Business tendency survey in construction - Capacity utilization BTSCcu M nsa GUS 11 
Business tendency survey in construction - Financial situation BTSCfs M nsa GUS 11 
Business tendency survey in construction -  General business tendency climate BTSCcli M nsa GUS 11 
Business tendency survey in industry - General economic situation BTSIges M nsa GUS 11 
Business tendency survey in industry - Current stocks of finished products BTSIsfp M nsa GUS 11 
Business tendency survey in industry - General business tendency climate BTSIcli M nsa GUS 11 
Business tendency survey in industry - Current volume of sold production BTSIsold M nsa GUS 11 
Business tendency survey in retail trade - General economic situation BTSRges M nsa GUS 11 
Business tendency survey in retail trade - Stocks of goods BTSRsg M nsa GUS 11 
Business tendency survey in retail trade - General business tendency climate BTSRcli M nsa GUS 11 
Business tendency survey in retail trade - Amount of goods sold BTSRsold M nsa GUS 11 
Sold production of industry, total, current prices, bln PLN IndProdT M nsa GUS 7 
Sold production of industry, manufacturing, bln PLN IndProdM M nsa GUS 7 
Retail sale of goods, current prices RetailS M nsa GUS 8 
Wholesale of goods by trade enterprises, current prices WholeS M nsa GUS 8 
Investments newly started, number of tasks in thousands InvStart 3Q nsa GUS 17 
Real sector expectations 
Business tendency survey in construction - Expected general economic situation BTSCeges M nsa GUS 11 
Business tendency survey in construction - Expected financial situation BTSCefs M nsa GUS 11 
Business tendency survey in industry - Expected general economic situation BTSIeges M nsa GUS 11 
Business tendency survey in industry - Expected volume of sold production BTSIesold M nsa GUS 11 
Business tendency survey in industry - Expected domestic and foreign order-books BTSIedfob M nsa GUS 11 
Business tendency survey in industry - Expected ability to pay the current debts BTSIeabpay M nsa GUS 11 
Business tendency survey in retail trade - Expected general economic situation BTSReges M nsa GUS 11 
Business tendency survey in retail trade - Expected amount of goods sold BTSResold M nsa GUS 11 
Business tendency survey in retail trade - Expected orders placed with suppliers BTSReo M nsa GUS 11 
Business tendency survey in retail trade - Expected ability to pay the current debts BTSReabpay M nsa GUS 11 
TABLE 4 (continued) 

































Sold production of industry forecast by banking analysts for the previous month, annual rate in percent ReuIndOut_prm M nsa Reuters 4 
Sold production of industry average annual rate forecast by banking analysts for the next year, percent ReuIndOut_prm M nsa Reuters 4 
Gross domestic product annual rate forecast by banking analysts for the previous quarter, percent ReuGDP_prq M nsa Reuters 4 
Gross domestic product annual rate forecast by banking analysts for the current quarter, percent ReuGDP_cq M nsa Reuters 4 
Gross domestic product average annual rate forecast by banking analysts for the current year, percent ReuGDP_cya M nsa Reuters 4 
Gross domestic product annual rate forecast by banking analysts for the next quarter, percent ReuGDP_1q M nsa Reuters 4 
Gross domestic product annual rate forecast by banking analysts over the next 2 quarters, percent ReuGDP_2q M nsa Reuters 4 
GDP central projection by NBP for the current quarter, annual rate  in percent NBP_GDP_cq Q nsa 
GDP central projection by NBP for the next quarter, annual rate in percent NBP_GDP_1q Q nsa 
GDP central projection by NBP over next two quarters, annual rate in percent NBP_GDP_2q Q nsa 
GDP central projection by NBP over next three quarters, annual rate in percent NBP_GDP_3q Q nsa 
GDP central projection by NBP over next four quarters, annual rate in percent NBP_GDP_4q Q nsa 
GDP central projection by NBP over next five quarters, annual rate in percent NBP_GDP_5q Q nsa 
GDP central projection by NBP over next six quarters, annual rate in percent NBP_GDP_6q Q nsa 
GDP central projection by NBP over next seven quarters, annual rate in percent NBP_GDP_7q Q nsa 
GDP central projection by NBP over next eight quarters, annual rate in percent NBP_GDP_8q Q nsa 
GDP projections, 
published in the NBP’s 
Inflation Reports since 
May 2005. Since 2006 
they are prepared for 
MPC’s meetings in 
January, April, July and 
October 
Labour market and wages 
Unemployed persons, mln, LFS (BAEL) UnemplLFS Q nsa GUS 12 
Unemployed persons, urban areas, mln, LFS (BAEL) UnempluLFS Q nsa GUS 12 
Unemployment rate in %, total, LFS (BAEL) URLFS Q nsa GUS 12 
Unemployment rate in %, males, LFS (BAEL) URmLFS Q nsa GUS 12 
Unemployment rate in %, urban areas, LFS (BAEL) URuLFS Q nsa GUS 12 
Unemployment rate in %, persons aged 15-24 years, LFS (BAEL) UR1524LFS Q nsa GUS 12 
Economically inactive persons, mln, LFS (BAEL) EcinactLFS Q nsa GUS 13 
Employed  persons, mln, LFS (BAEL) EmplLFS Q nsa GUS 13 
Activity rate, total, LFS (BAEL) ARLFS Q nsa GUS 13 
Activity rate, urban areas, LFS (BAEL) ARuLFS Q nsa GUS 13 
Employment rate, total, LFS (BAEL) ERLFS Q nsa GUS 13 
Employment rate, urban areas, LFS (BAEL) ERuLFS Q nsa GUS 13 
Registered unemployed persons, mln Unempl M nsa GUS 8 
Number of employed, corporate sector, total, mln EmplCS M nsa GUS 8 
Average employment, corporate sector, total, mln EmplCSav M nsa GUS 8 
Average employee earnings (wages and salaries), total, corporate sector, thousands PLN EarnCS M nsa GUS 8 
Average monthly gross wages and salaries, nominal, total, thousands PLN Wagemav Q nsa GUS 6 
Employment expectations 
Business tendency survey in construction - Expected employment BTSCeem M nsa GUS 11 
Business tendency survey in industry - Expected employment BTSIeem M nsa GUS 11 
Business tendency survey in retail trade - Expected employment BTSReem M nsa GUS 11 
Market interest rates 
Warsaw Interbank Offer Rate (WIBOR), 1-month, annualized percent WIBOR1m D nsa Reuters & Money.pl D 
Warsaw Interbank Offer Rate (WIBOR), 3-month, annualized percent WIBOR3m D nsa Reuters & Money.pl D 
Warsaw Interbank Offer Rate (WIBOR), 6-month, annualized percent WIBOR6m D nsa Reuters & Money.pl D 
Warsaw Interbank Offer Rate (WIBOR), 9-month, annualized percent WIBOR9m D nsa Reuters & Money.pl D 
Warsaw Interbank Offer Rate (WIBOR), 12-month, annualized percent WIBOR12m D nsa Reuters & Money.pl D 
52-week Treasury bill rate, average yield from the last auction prior to a MPC meeting, annualized percent TB52w IR nsa Ministry of Finance n/a 
Interest rates' expectations 
52-week Treasury bill yield forecast by banking analysts by the end of current month, annualized percent Reu52w_cm M nsa Reuters 4 
52-week Treasury bill yield forecast by banking analysts over next 12 months, annualized percent Reu52w_12m M nsa Reuters 4 
3-month WIBOR forecast by banking analysts by the end of current month, annualized percent ReuWibor3M_cm M nsa Reuters 4 
3-month WIBOR forecast by banking analysts over next 12 months, annualized percent ReuWibor3M_12m M nsa Reuters 4 
2-year Treasury bond yield forecast by banking analysts by the end of current month, annualized percent Reu2y_cm M nsa Reuters 4 
2-year Treasury bond yield forecast by banking analysts over next 12 months, annualized percent Reu2y_12m M nsa Reuters 4 
5-year Treasury bond yield forecast by banking analysts by the end of current month, annualized percent Reu5y_cm M nsa Reuters 4 
5-year Treasury bond yield forecast by banking analysts over next 12 months, annualized percent Reu5y_12m M nsa Reuters 4 
10-year Treasury bond yield forecast by banking analysts by the end of current month, annualized percent Reu10y_cm M nsa Reuters 4 
10-year Treasury bond yield forecast by banking analysts over next 12 months, annualized percent Reu10y_12m M nsa Reuters 4 
Reference rate forecast by banking analysts by the end of current month, annualized percent ReuRR_cm M nsa Reuters 4 
Reference rate forecast by banking analysts over next 12 months, annualized percent ReuRR_12m M nsa Reuters 4 
Exchange rates 
Average monthly exchange rate, PLN/USD ERUSm M nsa NBP 19 
Average monthly exchange rate, PLN/EUR EREUm M nsa NBP 19 
Daily exchange rate, PLN/USD ERUS D nsa NBP D 
Daily exchange rate, PLN / (DM up to 31.12.1998 / EUR from 1.1.1999) EREU D nsa NBP D 
Exchange rates' expectations 
Exchange rate PLN/EUR forecast by banking analysts by the end of current month ReuEReu_cm M nsa Reuters 4 
Exchange rate PLN/EUR forecast by banking analysts over next 12 months ReuEReu_12m M nsa Reuters 4 
Exchange rate PLN/USD forecast by banking analysts by the end of current month ReuERus_cm M nsa Reuters 4 
Exchange rate PLN/USD forecast by banking analysts over next 12 months ReuERus_12m M nsa Reuters 4 
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Foreign policy interest rates 
US Federal funds rate target, annualized percent dFFR D nsa US Federal Reserve D 
Main ECB target rate: minimum bid rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem, annualized 
percent dECBR D nsa 
European 
Central Bank D 
Lending and credit 
MFI's loans to private corporations, bln PLN Loanpc M nsa NBP 2 
MFI's loans to private corporations, total, bln PLN Loanpct M nsa NBP 2 
MFI's loans and other claims on households, bln PLN Claimh M nsa NBP 2 
MFI's loans and other claims on households, total, bln PLN Claimht M nsa NBP 2 
MFI's loans to households, bln PLN Loanh M nsa NBP 2 
MFI's loans to households, total, bln PLN Loanht M nsa NBP 2 
MFI's loans and other claims to non-financial corporations, bln PLN Claimnfc M nsa NBP 2 
MFI's loans and other claims to non-financial corporations, total, bln PLN Claimnfct M nsa NBP 2 
MFI's loans to non-financial corporations, bln PLN Loannfc M nsa NBP 2 
MFI's loans to non-financial corporations, total, bln PLN Loannfct M nsa NBP 2 
MFI's loans and other claims on non-financial sector, bln PLN Claimnfs M nsa NBP 2 
MFI's loans and other claims on non-financial sector, total stocks, bln PLN Claimnfst M nsa NBP 2 
MFI's credit to domestic residents, bln PLN Cred M nsa NBP 2 
Deposits and other liabilities of MFIs to non-financial corporations, bln PLN Depnfc M nsa NBP 2 
Deposits and other liabilities of MFIs to non-financial corporations, total stocks, bln PLN Depnfct M nsa NBP 2 
Deposits and other liabilities of MFIs to non-financial sector, bln PLN Depnfs M nsa NBP 2 
Deposits and other liabilities of MFIs to non-financial sector, total stocks, bln PLN Depnfst M nsa NBP 2 
Deposits and other liabilities of MFIs to households, bln PLN Deph M nsa NBP 2 
Deposits and other liabilities of MFIs to households, total, bln PLN DepHT M nsa NBP 2 
Housing loans to households, bln PLN Hloanh M nsa NBP 2 
Housing loans to households, total, bln PLN HloanT M nsa NBP 2 
Deposits and other liabilities of MFIs to other domestic residents in zloty, bln PLN DepDRes M nsa NBP 2 
Deposits and other liabilities of MFIs to other domestic residents in zloty and foreign currency, bln PLN DepDResT M nsa NBP 2 
Deposits and other liabilities of MFIs to central government in zloty, bln PLN DepGov M nsa NBP 2 
Deposits and other liabilities of MFIs to central government in zloty and foreign currency, bln PLN DepGovT M nsa NBP 2 
Inter-MFI's liabilities in zloty, bln PLN DepiMFI M nsa NBP 2 
Inter-MFI's liabilities in zloty and foreign currency, bln PLN DepiMFIT M nsa NBP 2 
Loans and other claims of MFIs to other domestic residents in zloty, bln PLN ClaimDRes M nsa NBP 2 
Loans and other claims of MFIs to other domestic residents in zloty and foreign currency, bln PLN ClaimDResT M nsa NBP 2 
Loans and other claims of MFIs to central government in zloty, bln PLN ClaimGov M nsa NBP 2 
Loans and other claims of MFIs to central government in zloty and foreign currency, bln PLN ClaimGovT M nsa NBP 2 
Inter-MFI's claims in zloty, bln PLN ClaimiMFI M nsa NBP 2 
Inter-MFI's claims in zloty and foreign currency, bln PLN ClaimiMFIT M nsa NBP 2 
 
Notes: 
Release frequencies: D - daily, M - monthly, Q - quarterly, 3Q - second, third and fourth quarters, D – daily, IR – irregular. 
Release schedules: see Table 6 for availability of statistical data at MPC's meetings for all release schedules. 





 Transformations of original data 
Transformation description Mnemonics 
(Percentage) change since the previous business day _D 
Five-day moving average _5da 
Three-week moving average _3wa 
(Percentage) change since the previous month _M 
(Percentage) change since the previous quarter _Q 
(Percentage) change since the corresponding period of previous year _Y 
Three-month moving average _3ma 
Four-quarter moving average of the (percentage) change since the corresponding period of previous year _4qa 
Change since the previous MPC's meeting _Z 
Change since the date of the last non-zero adjustment to the reference rate _C 
Deviation from the target rate (for CPI) _T 
Original value of variable if it is positive, and zero otherwise _P 
Original value of variable if it is negative, and zero otherwise _N 
Spread between some variable and the reference rate 
First-order lagged variable 
Variable_RR 
_L1 
Indicator variable: one if variable is equal to or above the inflation target, zero otherwise Ind_Variable_T 
 
Notes: 
The transformations can be combined, for example, _YM means the change since the previous month to (percentage) change since the corresponding period of 
previous year, or _YC means the change since the date of the last non-zero adjustment to the reference rate to (percentage) change since the corresponding period of previous 
year. 
TABLE 6. 
Availability of latest statistical data at policy meetings of the MPC 
Release schedule Date of 
MPC's 
meeting # 2 # 3 # 4 # 6 # 7 # 8 # 9 # 11 # 12 # 13 # 17 # 19 
1998-02-25 01-98 Q3-97 02-98 Q4-97 01-98 01-98 01-98 01-98 Q4-97 Q4-97 Q3-97 01-98 
1998-03-18 02-98 Q3-97 03-98 Q4-97 02-98 02-98 02-98 02-98 Q4-97 Q4-97 Q4-97 02-98 
1998-04-22 03-98 Q4-97 04-98 Q4-97 03-98 03-98 03-98 03-98 Q4-97 Q4-97 Q4-97 03-98 
1998-05-20 04-98 Q4-97 05-98 Q1-98 04-98 04-98 04-98 04-98 Q1-98 Q1-98 Q4-97 04-98 
1998-06-17 05-98 Q4-97 06-98 Q1-98 05-98 05-98 05-98 05-98 Q1-98 Q1-98 Q4-97 05-98 
1998-07-16 06-98 Q1-98 07-98 Q1-98 06-98 06-98 06-98 06-98 Q1-98 Q1-98 Q4-97 06-98 
1998-08-19 07-98 Q1-98 08-98 Q2-98 07-98 07-98 07-98 07-98 Q2-98 Q2-98 Q2-98 07-98 
1998-09-09 08-98 Q1-98 09-98 Q2-98 07-98 07-98 07-98 08-98 Q2-98 Q2-98 Q2-98 08-98 
1998-10-28 09-98 Q2-98 10-98 Q2-98 09-98 09-98 09-98 09-98 Q3-98 Q2-98 Q2-98 09-98 
1998-11-18 10-98 Q2-98 11-98 Q3-98 10-98 10-98 10-98 10-98 Q3-98 Q3-98 Q3-98 10-98 
1998-12-09 11-98 Q2-98 12-98 Q3-98 10-98 10-98 10-98 11-98 Q3-98 Q3-98 Q3-98 11-98 
1999-01-20 12-98 Q3-98 01-99 Q3-98 12-98 12-98 12-98 12-98 Q3-98 Q3-98 Q3-98 12-98 
1999-02-17 01-99 Q3-98 02-99 Q4-98 01-99 01-99 01-99 01-99 Q4-98 Q4-98 Q3-98 01-99 
1999-03-24 02-99 Q4-98 03-99 Q4-98 02-99 02-99 02-99 02-99 Q4-98 Q4-98 Q4-98 02-99 
1999-04-21 03-99 Q4-98 04-99 Q4-98 03-99 03-99 03-99 03-99 Q4-98 Q4-98 Q4-98 03-99 
1999-05-27 04-99 Q4-98 05-99 Q1-99 04-99 04-99 04-99 04-99 Q1-99 Q4-98 Q4-98 04-99 
1999-06-16 05-99 Q4-98 06-99 Q1-99 05-99 05-99 05-99 05-99 Q1-99 Q1-99 Q4-98 05-99 
1999-07-21 06-99 Q1-99 07-99 Q1-99 06-99 06-99 06-99 06-99 Q1-99 Q1-99 Q4-98 06-99 
1999-08-18 07-99 Q1-99 08-99 Q2-99 07-99 07-99 07-99 07-99 Q1-99 Q1-99 Q2-99 07-99 
1999-09-22 08-99 Q2-99 09-99 Q2-99 08-99 08-99 08-99 08-99 Q1-99 Q1-99 Q2-99 08-99 
1999-10-20 09-99 Q2-99 10-99 Q2-99 09-99 09-99 09-99 09-99 Q1-99 Q1-99 Q2-99 09-99 
1999-11-17 10-99 Q2-99 11-99 Q3-99 10-99 10-99 10-99 10-99 Q1-99 Q1-99 Q3-99 10-99 
1999-12-15 11-99 Q2-99 12-99 Q3-99 11-99 11-99 11-99 11-99 Q1-99 Q1-99 Q3-99 11-99 
2000-01-26 12-99 Q3-99 01-00 Q3-99 12-99 12-99 12-99 12-99 Q1-99 Q1-99 Q3-99 12-99 
2000-02-23 01-00 Q3-99 02-00 Q4-99 01-00 01-00 01-00 01-00 Q1-99 Q1-99 Q3-99 01-00 
2000-03-29 02-00 Q4-99 03-00 Q4-99 02-00 02-00 02-00 02-00 Q1-99 Q1-99 Q4-99 02-00 
2000-04-26 03-00 Q4-99 04-00 Q4-99 03-00 03-00 03-00 03-00 Q1-99 Q1-99 Q4-99 03-00 
2000-05-24 04-00 Q4-99 05-00 Q1-00 04-00 04-00 04-00 04-00 Q1-99 Q1-99 Q4-99 04-00 
2000-06-21 05-00 Q1-00 06-00 Q1-00 05-00 05-00 05-00 05-00 Q1-00 Q1-00 Q4-99 05-00 
2000-07-19 06-00 Q1-00 07-00 Q1-00 06-00 06-00 06-00 06-00 Q1-00 Q1-00 Q4-99 06-00 
2000-08-30 07-00 Q1-00 08-00 Q2-00 07-00 07-00 07-00 07-00 Q1-00 Q1-00 Q2-00 07-00 
2000-09-19 08-00 Q1-00 09-00 Q2-00 08-00 08-00 08-00 08-00 Q2-00 Q2-00 Q2-00 08-00 
2000-10-25 09-00 Q2-00 10-00 Q2-00 09-00 09-00 09-00 09-00 Q2-00 Q2-00 Q2-00 09-00 
2000-11-29 10-00 Q2-00 11-00 Q3-00 10-00 10-00 10-00 10-00 Q2-00 Q2-00 Q3-00 10-00 
2000-12-20 11-00 Q3-00 12-00 Q3-00 11-00 11-00 11-00 11-00 Q3-00 Q3-00 Q3-00 11-00 
2001-01-22 12-00 Q3-00 01-01 Q3-00 12-00 12-00 12-00 12-00 Q3-00 Q3-00 Q3-00 12-00 
2001-02-28 01-01 Q3-00 02-01 Q4-00 01-01 01-01 01-01 01-01 Q4-00 Q3-00 Q3-00 01-01 
2001-03-28 02-01 Q4-00 03-01 Q4-00 02-01 02-01 02-01 02-01 Q4-00 Q4-00 Q4-00 02-01 
2001-04-26 03-01 Q4-00 04-01 Q4-00 03-01 03-01 03-01 03-01 Q4-00 Q4-00 Q4-00 03-01 
2001-05-30 04-01 Q4-00 05-01 Q1-01 04-01 04-01 04-01 04-01 Q4-00 Q4-00 Q4-00 04-01 
2001-06-27 05-01 Q1-01 06-01 Q1-01 05-01 05-01 05-01 05-01 Q4-00 Q4-00 Q4-00 05-01 
2001-07-20 06-01 Q1-01 07-01 Q1-01 06-01 06-01 06-01 06-01 Q4-00 Q1-01 Q4-00 06-01 
2001-08-22 07-01 Q1-01 08-01 Q2-01 07-01 07-01 07-01 07-01 Q1-01 Q1-01 Q2-01 07-01 
2001-09-26 08-01 Q2-01 09-01 Q2-01 08-01 08-01 08-01 08-01 Q2-01 Q2-01 Q2-01 08-01 
2001-10-25 09-01 Q2-01 10-01 Q2-01 09-01 09-01 09-01 09-01 Q2-01 Q2-01 Q2-01 09-01 
2001-11-28 10-01 Q2-01 11-01 Q3-01 10-01 10-01 10-01 10-01 Q3-01 Q3-01 Q3-01 10-01 
2001-12-19 11-01 Q3-01 12-01 Q3-01 11-01 11-01 11-01 11-01 Q3-01 Q3-01 Q3-01 11-01 
2002-01-30 12-01 Q3-01 01-02 Q3-01 12-01 12-01 12-01 01-02 Q3-01 Q3-01 Q3-01 12-01 
2002-02-27 01-02 Q3-01 02-02 Q4-01 01-02 01-02 01-02 02-02 Q4-01 Q3-01 Q3-01 01-02 
2002-03-27 02-02 Q4-01 03-02 Q4-01 02-02 02-02 02-02 03-02 Q4-01 Q4-01 Q4-01 02-02 
2002-04-26 03-02 Q4-01 04-02 Q4-01 03-02 03-02 03-02 04-02 Q4-01 Q4-01 Q4-01 03-02 
2002-05-29 04-02 Q4-01 05-02 Q1-02 04-02 04-02 04-02 05-02 Q1-02 Q4-01 Q4-01 04-02 
2002-06-26 05-02 Q1-02 06-02 Q1-02 05-02 05-02 05-02 06-02 Q1-02 Q1-02 Q4-01 05-02 
2002-07-19 06-02 Q1-02 07-02 Q1-02 06-02 06-02 06-02 07-02 Q1-02 Q1-02 Q4-01 06-02 
2002-08-28 07-02 Q1-02 08-02 Q2-02 07-02 07-02 07-02 08-02 Q2-02 Q1-02 Q2-02 07-02 
TABLE 6 (continued) 
Release schedule Date of 
MPC's 
meeting # 2 # 3 # 4 # 6 # 7 # 8 # 9 # 11 # 12 # 13 # 17 # 19 
2002-09-25 08-02 Q2-02 09-02 Q2-02 08-02 08-02 08-02 09-02 Q2-02 Q2-02 Q2-02 08-02 
2002-10-23 09-02 Q2-02 10-02 Q2-02 09-02 09-02 09-02 10-02 Q2-02 Q2-02 Q2-02 09-02 
2002-11-27 10-02 Q2-02 11-02 Q3-02 10-02 10-02 10-02 11-02 Q2-02 Q2-02 Q3-02 10-02 
2002-12-18 11-02 Q2-02 12-02 Q3-02 11-02 11-02 11-02 11-02 Q3-02 Q2-02 Q3-02 11-02 
2003-01-29 12-02 Q3-02 01-03 Q3-02 12-02 12-02 12-02 01-03 Q3-02 Q3-02 Q3-02 12-02 
2003-02-26 01-03 Q3-02 02-03 Q4-02 01-03 01-03 01-03 02-03 Q4-02 Q3-02 Q3-02 01-03 
2003-03-26 02-03 Q4-02 03-03 Q4-02 02-03 02-03 02-03 03-03 Q4-02 Q4-02 Q4-02 02-03 
2003-04-24 03-03 Q4-02 04-03 Q4-02 03-03 03-03 03-03 04-03 Q4-02 Q4-02 Q4-02 03-03 
2003-05-28 04-03 Q4-02 05-03 Q1-03 04-03 04-03 04-03 05-03 Q1-03 Q4-02 Q4-02 04-03 
2003-06-25 05-03 Q1-03 06-03 Q1-03 05-03 05-03 05-03 06-03 Q1-03 Q1-03 Q4-02 05-03 
2003-07-18 06-03 Q1-03 07-03 Q1-03 06-03 06-03 06-03 06-03 Q1-03 Q1-03 Q4-02 06-03 
2003-08-27 07-03 Q1-03 08-03 Q2-03 07-03 07-03 07-03 08-03 Q1-03 Q1-03 Q2-03 07-03 
2003-09-30 08-03 Q2-03 09-03 Q2-03 08-03 08-03 08-03 09-03 Q2-03 Q2-03 Q2-03 08-03 
2003-10-29 09-03 Q2-03 10-03 Q2-03 09-03 09-03 09-03 10-03 Q2-03 Q2-03 Q2-03 09-03 
2003-11-26 10-03 Q2-03 11-03 Q3-03 10-03 10-03 10-03 11-03 Q2-03 Q2-03 Q3-03 10-03 
2003-12-17 11-03 Q2-03 11-03 Q3-03 10-03 10-03 11-03 11-03 Q2-03 Q2-03 Q3-03 11-03 
2004-01-21 12-03 Q3-03 01-04 Q3-03 12-03 12-03 12-03 12-03 Q3-03 Q3-03 Q3-03 12-03 
2004-02-25 01-04 Q4-03 02-04 Q4-03 01-04 01-04 01-04 02-04 Q4-03 Q3-03 Q3-03 01-04 
2004-03-31 02-04 Q4-03 03-04 Q4-03 02-04 02-04 02-04 03-04 Q4-03 Q4-03 Q4-03 02-04 
2004-04-27 03-04 Q4-03 04-04 Q4-03 03-04 03-04 03-04 04-04 Q4-03 Q4-03 Q4-03 03-04 
2004-05-26 04-04 Q4-03 05-04 Q1-04 04-04 04-04 04-04 05-04 Q4-03 Q4-03 Q4-03 04-04 
2004-06-30 05-04 Q1-04 06-04 Q1-04 05-04 05-04 05-04 06-04 Q1-04 Q1-04 Q4-03 05-04 
2004-07-28 06-04 Q1-04 07-04 Q1-04 06-04 06-04 06-04 07-04 Q1-04 Q1-04 Q4-03 06-04 
2004-08-25 07-04 Q1-04 08-04 Q2-04 07-04 07-04 07-04 08-04 Q1-04 Q1-04 Q4-03 07-04 
2004-09-29 08-04 Q2-04 09-04 Q2-04 08-04 08-04 08-04 09-04 Q2-04 Q2-04 Q2-04 08-04 
2004-10-27 09-04 Q2-04 10-04 Q2-04 09-04 09-04 09-04 10-04 Q2-04 Q2-04 Q2-04 09-04 
2004-11-24 10-04 Q2-04 11-04 Q3-04 10-04 10-04 10-04 11-04 Q2-04 Q2-04 Q3-04 10-04 
2004-12-15 11-04 Q3-04 12-04 Q3-04 10-04 11-04 11-04 11-04 Q2-04 Q2-04 Q3-04 11-04 
2005-01-26 12-04 Q3-04 01-05 Q3-04 12-04 12-04 12-04 01-05 Q3-04 Q3-04 Q3-04 12-04 
2005-02-25 01-05 Q3-04 02-05 Q4-04 01-05 01-05 01-05 02-05 Q3-04 Q3-04 Q3-04 01-05 
2005-03-30 02-05 Q4-04 03-05 Q4-04 02-05 02-05 02-05 03-05 Q4-04 Q4-04 Q4-04 02-05 
2005-04-27 03-05 Q4-04 04-05 Q4-04 03-05 03-05 03-05 04-05 Q4-04 Q4-04 Q4-04 03-05 
2005-05-25 04-05 Q4-04 05-05 Q1-05 04-05 04-05 04-05 05-05 Q4-04 Q4-04 Q4-04 04-05 
2005-06-29 05-05 Q1-05 06-05 Q1-05 05-05 05-05 05-05 06-05 Q1-05 Q1-05 Q4-04 05-05 
2005-07-27 06-05 Q1-05 07-05 Q1-05 06-05 06-05 06-05 07-05 Q1-05 Q1-05 Q4-04 06-05 
2005-08-31 07-05 Q2-05 08-05 Q2-05 07-05 07-05 07-05 08-05 Q1-05 Q1-05 Q2-05 07-05 
2005-09-28 08-05 Q2-05 09-05 Q2-05 08-05 08-05 08-05 09-05 Q2-05 Q2-05 Q2-05 08-05 
2005-10-26 09-05 Q2-05 10-05 Q2-05 09-05 09-05 09-05 10-05 Q2-05 Q2-05 Q2-05 09-05 
2005-11-30 10-05 Q3-05 11-05 Q3-05 10-05 10-05 10-05 11-05 Q2-05 Q2-05 Q3-05 10-05 
2005-12-21 11-05 Q3-05 12-05 Q3-05 11-05 11-05 11-05 11-05 Q2-05 Q2-05 Q3-05 11-05 
2006-01-31 12-05 Q3-05 01-06 Q4-05 12-05 12-05 12-05 01-06 Q3-05 Q3-05 Q3-05 12-05 
2006-02-28 01-06 Q3-05 02-06 Q4-05 01-06 01-06 01-06 02-06 Q3-05 Q3-05 Q3-05 01-06 
2006-03-29 02-06 Q4-05 03-06 Q4-05 02-06 02-06 02-06 03-06 Q4-05 Q4-05 Q4-05 02-06 
2006-04-26 03-06 Q4-05 04-06 Q4-05 03-06 03-06 03-06 04-06 Q4-05 Q4-05 Q4-05 03-06 
2006-05-31 04-06 Q1-06 05-06 Q1-06 04-06 04-06 04-06 05-06 Q4-05 Q4-05 Q4-05 04-06 
2006-06-28 05-06 Q1-06 06-06 Q1-06 05-06 05-06 05-06 06-06 Q1-06 Q1-06 Q4-05 05-06 
2006-07-26 06-06 Q1-06 07-06 Q1-06 06-06 06-06 06-06 07-06 Q1-06 Q1-06 Q4-05 06-06 
2006-08-30 07-06 Q2-06 08-06 Q2-06 07-06 07-06 07-06 08-06 Q1-06 Q1-06 Q2-06 07-06 
2006-09-27 08-06 Q2-06 09-06 Q2-06 08-06 08-06 08-06 09-06 Q2-06 Q2-06 Q2-06 08-06 
2006-10-25 09-06 Q2-06 10-06 Q2-06 09-06 09-06 09-06 10-06 Q2-06 Q2-06 Q2-06 09-06 
 
 
Notes:   See Table 4 to determine according to which schedule each variable has been released. 
_______________________________________________ 
 





Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests 
Variable 











RRC 1998/04 - 2007/08   2 -3.07 0.002 0.718 
ExInf_T_M 1998/05 - 2007/08   2 -4.70 0.000 0.287 
GDPnaiy 1998/09 - 2007/08 C 6 -2.90 0.049 0.737 
GDPRna_Y 1998/05 - 2007/08 C 2 -2.78 0.065 0.956 
GVATnaiy 1998/10 - 2007/08 C 7 -2.81 0.060 0.783 
GVARna_Y 1998/07 - 2007/08 C 4 -3.86 0.003 0.537 
CPI_T_YM 1999/03 - 2007/08   12 -5.47 0.000 0.922 
CPIxac_T_YC 1999/04 - 2007/08 C 12 -3.61 0.007 0.999 
CPIxac_T_YM 1999/04 - 2007/08   12 -4.40 0.000 0.881 
CPIxmvf_T_YM 1999/04 - 2007/08   12 -5.33 0.000 0.914 
Ereu 1993/01 - 2007/08 C 8 -3.09 0.028 0.216 
WIBOR12m_ZP 2001/04 - 2007/08 C 0 -6.31 0.000 0.891 
WIBOR12m_RR 2001/03 - 2007/08 C 0 -2.82 0.005 0.084 
WIBOR9m_RR 2001/04 - 2007/08 C 1 -2.40 0.017 0.312 
WIBOR6m_RR 1998/03 - 2007/08 C 0 -3.93 0.003 0.171 
WIBOR3m_RR 1998/03 - 2007/08 C 0 -4.84 0.000 0.401 
WIBOR1m_RR 1998/03 - 2007/08 C 0 -5.61 0.000 0.878 
WIBOR3m_C  1998/03 - 2007/08 C 0 -4.98 0.000 0.725 
 
Notes: 
 The null hypothesis in ADF test: a series has a unit root. 
 The null hypothesis of the Ljung-Box Q-test of serial correlation: there is no serial correlation in 
the residuals up to 12th order. 
 * C - constant. 
 ** MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. 
 For definitions of variable mnemonics see Tables 4 and 5. 
 RRC is the reference rate change. 
 All tests are performed using Eviews 5.0. 
TABLE 8. 
Tests for structural change 
 
Model 8.1 Model 8.2 Model 8.3 Model 8.4 Dependent variable - 
change to the 
reference rate ExInf_T_M GDPnaiy ExInf_T_M GDPRna_Y ExInf_T_M GVATnaiy ExInf_T_M GVARna_Y 
Full sample: 1999/02 - 2006/10 (93 observations) 
Parameter estimate 0.618 0.478 0.495 0.441 0.604 0.467 0.529 0.382 
Standard error 0.214 0.093 0.221 0.083 0.211 0.094 0.215 0.076 
P-Value 0.0038 <.0001 0.0253 <.0001 0.0042 <.0001 0.0140 <.0001 
Log likelihood -56.21 -55.56 -57.84 -58.12 
Likelihood ratio 44.27 45.59 41.01 40.46 
Count R² 0.68 0.69 0.66 0.69 
Adj. count R² 0.12 0.15 0.06 0.15 
McKelvey & Zavoina R² 0.51 0.52 0.48 0.48 
Sup-LR test for structural change with unknown change point 
Change point * April 2002 April 2002 April 2002 April 2002 
Max LR ** 37.43 45.53 40.40 34.72 
First sub-sample: 1999/02 - 2002/03 (38 observations) 
Parameter estimate 0.304 0.288 0.213 0.341 0.300 0.284 0.236 0.288 
Standard error 0.224 0.127 0.236 0.127 0.223 0.128 0.228 0.119 
P-Value 0.1747 0.0230 0.3683 0.0071 0.1794 0.0257 0.3010 0.0157 
Log likelihood -26.17 -24.09 -26.28 -25.79 
Likelihood ratio 7.81 11.97 7.59 8.56 
Count R² 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 
Adj. count R² 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
McKelvey & Zavoina R² 0.28 0.41 0.27 0.30 
Second sub-sample: 2002/04 - 2006/10 (55 observations) 
Parameter estimate 5.267 1.118 9.352 1.761 5.569 1.228 5.244 0.793 
Standard error 1.545 0.272 3.132 0.524 1.615 0.298 1.564 0.204 
P-Value 0.0006 <.0001 0.0028 0.0008 0.0006 <.0001 0.0008 0.0001 
Log likelihood -11.33 -8.70 -11.36 -14.97 
Likelihood ratio 69.92 75.18 69.85 62.64 
Count R² 0.91 0.98 0.93 0.87 
Adj. count R² 0.78 0.96 0.83 0.70 
McKelvey & Zavoina R² 0.91 0.97 0.92 0.90 
 
Notes: 
Tests are performed for ordered probit models with three outcome categories of dependent variable: 
"increase", "no change", and "decrease". Two threshold estimates are not reported. 
Count R² is the proportion of correct predictions. The predicted choice is one with the highest predicted 
probability. Adj. count R² is the proportion of correct predictions beyond the number that would be correctly guessed 
by choosing the outcome category with the largest percentage of observed cases. 
* Testing period: 2001/11 - 2003/11. 
** Andrews' asymptotical critical values: 'CV 1%' = 17.87, 'CV 5%' = 13.64.  
For definitions of variable mnemonics see Tables 4 and 5. 
 
TABLE 9. 
 Responses to real activity and inflation 
 
Model 9.1 Model 9.2 Model 9.3 Model 9.4 Dependent 
variable - 
change to the 
reference rate 
GDPnaiy ExInf_T_M GDPnaiy CPIxmvf_T_YM GDPnaiy CPI_T_YM GDPnaiy CPIxac_T_YM 
  First sub-sample: 1999/02 - 2002/03 (38 observations) 
Parameter 
estimate 0.288 0.304 0.283 1.453 0.411 1.412 0.367 1.699 
Standard 
error 0.127 0.224 0.152 0.505 0.170 0.442 0.170 0.495 
P-Value 0.0230 0.1747 0.0634 0.0040 0.0159 0.0014 0.0307 0.0006 
Log likelihood -26.17 -21.28 -18.80 -17.26 
Likelihood 
ratio 7.81 17.59 22.56 25.63 
AIC 60.34 50.55 45.59 42.52 
Count R² 0.71 0.76 0.82 0.82 
Adj. count R² 0.00 0.18 0.36 0.36 
McKelvey & 
Zavoina R² 0.28 0.57 0.65 0.69 
  Second sub-sample: 2002/04 - 2006/10 (55 observations) 
Parameter 
estimate 1.118 5.267 0.707 1.289 0.727 0.937 0.730 1.046 
Standard 
error 0.272 1.545 0.158 0.498 0.153 0.476 0.156 0.452 
P-Value <.0001 0.0006 <.0001 0.0097 <.0001 0.0491 <.0001 0.0206 
Log likelihood -11.33 -22.95 -24.32 -23.39 
Likelihood 
ratio 69.92 46.68 43.93 45.79 
AIC 30.66 53.89 56.65 54.79 
Count R² 0.91 0.86 0.82 0.84 
Adj. count R² 0.69 0.53 0.36 0.43 
McKelvey & 
Zavoina R² 0.91 0.73 0.70 0.72 
 
Notes: 
The ordered probit estimations are performed with three outcome categories of dependent variable: 
"increase", "no change", and "decrease". Two threshold estimates are not reported. 
Count R² is the proportion of correct predictions. The predicted choice is one with the highest predicted 
probability. Adj. count R² is the proportion of correct predictions beyond the number that would be correctly guessed 
by choosing the outcome category with the largest percentage of observed cases. 
For definitions of variable mnemonics see Tables 4 and 5. 
 
TABLE 10. 
 Tests for structural change 
Model 10.1 Model 10.2 Dependent variable – 
change to the reference 
rate Ereu CPIxac_T_YM Ind_CPI_T CPIxac_T_YC 
Full sample: 1999/02 - 2006/10 (93 observations) 
Log likelihood -62.10 -50.84 
Count R² 0.63 0.72 
Adj. count R² 0.00 0.24 
McKelvey & Zavoina R² 0.40 0.63 
Test for structural change with unknown change point 
Change point * April 2002 April 2002 
Max LR ** 26.84 17.12 
First sub-sample: 1999/02 - 2002/03 (38 observations) 
Parameter estimate 10.729 4.600 8.100 2.650 
Standard error 3.957 1.810 3.671 0.910 
P-Value 0.0067 0.0110 0.0275 0.0036 
Log likelihood -9.97 -10.44 
Likelihood ratio 40.20 39.26 
Count R² 0.87 0.95 
Adj. count R² 0.55 0.82 
McKelvey & Zavoina R² 0.96 0.97 
Second sub-sample: 2002/04 - 2006/10 (55 observations) 
Parameter estimate 1.055 1.013 1.709 0.948 
Standard error 0.629 0.371 0.513 0.242 
P-Value 0.0935 0.0063 0.0009 <.0001 
Log likelihood -38.71 -31.84 
Likelihood ratio 15.17 28.91 
Count R² 0.62 0.73 
Adj. count R² 0.09 0.35 
McKelvey & Zavoina R² 0.32 0.57 
Sample: 1998/03 - 2002/03 (49 observations) 
Parameter estimate 2.362 1.697 0.626 0.803 
Standard error 0.950 0.466 0.392 0.209 
P-Value 0.0129 0.0003 0.1106 0.0001 
Log likelihood -26.24 -31.03 
Likelihood ratio 31.04 21.45 
Count R² 0.71 0.69 
Adj. count R² 0.22 0.17 
McKelvey & Zavoina R² 0.67 0.50 
 
Notes: 
 Tests are performed for ordered probit models with three outcome categories of dependent variable: 
"increase", "no change", and "decrease". Two threshold estimates are not reported. 
 Count R² is the proportion of correct predictions. The predicted choice is one with the highest 
predicted probability. Adj. count R² is the proportion of correct predictions beyond the number that would be 
correctly guessed by choosing the outcome category with the largest percentage of observed cases. 
 * Testing period: 2001/03 - 2004/07. 
** Andrews' asymptotical critical values: 'CV 1%' = 19.08, 'CV 5%' = 14.87. 
For definitions of variable mnemonics see Tables 4 and 5. 
TABLE 11. 
 Tests for interest rate smoothing 
 
Model 
11.1.1 Model 11.1.2 Model 11.1.3 First sub-sample: 1999/02 - 2002/03 
RRC_L1 Ereu CPIxac_T_YM RRC_L1 Ind_CPI_T CPIxac_T_YC RRC_L1 
Parameter estimate 0.340 15.021 6.077 -1.041 8.534 2.695 -0.590 
Standard error 0.362 6.417 2.789 0.822 3.857 0.940 0.709 
P-Value 0.3469 0.0192 0.0294 0.2054 0.0269 0.0041 0.4057 
 Goodness-of-fit measures 
Log likelihood -29.63 -9.02 -10.08 
Likelihood ratio 0.90 42.11 39.99 
AIC 65.25 28.04 30.16 
Count R² 0.71 0.84 0.89 
Adj. count R² 0.00 0.45 0.64 
McKelvey & Zavoina R² 0.03 0.98 0.97 
Model 
11.2.1 Model 11.2.2 Model 11.2.3 Second sub-sample: 
 2002/04 - 2006/10 
RRC_L1 ExInf_T_M GDPRna_Y RRC_L1 ExInf_T_M GVATnaiy RRC_L1 
Parameter estimate 1.585 8.657 1.593 0.477 5.476 1.139 0.422 
Standard error 0.347 3.101   0.559 0.835 1.604 0.327 0.712 
P-Value <.0001 0.0052 0.0044 0.5682 0.0006 0.0005 0.5533 
 Goodness-of-fit measures 
Log likelihood -34.26 -8.54 -11.19 
Likelihood ratio 24.05 75.49 70.20 
AIC 74.53 27.09 32.38 
Count R² 0.73 0.96 0.93 
Adj. count R² 0.35 0.91 0.83 
McKelvey & Zavoina R² 0.45 0.97 0.92 
 
Notes: 
 The dependent variable - change to the reference rate. 
 The ordered probit estimations are performed with three outcome categories of dependent variable: 
"increase", "no change", and "decrease". Two threshold estimates are not reported. 
 RRC_L1 - lagged reference rate change. 
 Count R² is the proportion of correct predictions. The predicted choice is one with the highest predicted 
probability. Adj. count R² is the proportion of correct predictions beyond the number that would be correctly guessed 
by choosing the outcome category with the largest percentage of observed cases. 
For definitions of variable mnemonics see Tables 4 and 5. 
 
TABLE 12.1. 
Market anticipation of policy decisions 
Specification WIBOR1m_RR WIBOR3m_RR WIBOR6m_RR WIBOR9m_RR WIBOR12m_RR 
  First sub-sample: 1999/02 - 2002/03 
Parameter estimate 1.240 1.849 1.707     
Standard error 0.392 0.485 0.451     
P-Value 0.0015 0.0001 0.0002     
 Goodness-of-fit measures 
Log likelihood -23.55 -16.90 -14.45     
Likelihood ratio 13.04 26.35 31.25     
AIC 53.11 39.80 34.90     
Count R² 0.71 0.79 0.82     
Adj. count R² 0.00 0.27 0.36     
McKelvey & Zavoina R² 0.42 0.72 0.77     
  Second sub-sample: 2002/04 - 2006/10 
Parameter estimate 6.767 8.123 5.781 4.422 3.491 
Standard error 1.421 1.801 1.362 1.037 0.799 
P-Value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
 Goodness-of-fit measures 
Log likelihood -30.01 -17.61 -16.35 -17.47 -18.81 
Likelihood ratio 32.55 57.36 59.89 57.64 54.97 
66.03 41.22 38.69 40.94 43.61 
Count R² 0.80 0.87 0.85 0.84 0.82 
Adj. count R² 0.52 0.70 0.65 0.61 0.57 
McKelvey & Zavoina R² 0.59 0.84 0.87 0.86 0.84 
 
Notes:   The ordered probit estimations are performed with three outcome categories of dependent variable - 
change to the reference rate: "increase", "no change", and "decrease". Two threshold estimates are not reported. 
Count R² is the proportion of correct predictions. The predicted choice is one with the highest predicted 
probability. Adj. count R² is the proportion of correct predictions beyond the number that would be correctly guessed 
by choosing the outcome category with the largest percentage of observed cases. 
TABLE 12.2. 
Comparison with market anticipation  
First sub-sample: 1999/02 - 2002/03 WIBOR6m_RR Reuters survey Model 10.2 
    
Proportion of correct predictions 0.82 0.87 0.95 
    
Average likelihood of observed rate changes 0.77 0.80 0.83 
    
Second sub-sample: 2002/04 - 2006/10 WIBOR6m_RR Reuters survey Model 8.2 
    
Proportion of correct predictions 0.85 0.89 0.98 
    
Average likelihood of observed rate changes 0.81 0.82 0.90 
    
 
Notes:   The predictions are made in terms of three possible policy choices: "increase", "no change", 
or "decrease" in the reference rate. The predicted choice is one with the highest predicted probability. 
Model 8.2: ExInf_T_M and GDPRna_Y. Model 10.2:  Ind_CPI_T and CPIxac_T_YC. 
 For definitions of variable mnemonics see Tables 4 and 5. 
TABLE 13.1. 
Market anticipation of policy decisions in 2002/04 - 2006/10 
Model 13.1 Model 13.2 Model 13.3 Model 13.4 Model 13.5 Specification 
WIBOR1m_RR WIBOR3m_RR WIBOR6m_RR WIBOR9m_RR WIBOR12m_RR 
Parameter estimate 4.905 5.156 3.858 3.148 2.684 
Standard error 1.074 0.939 0.718 0.609 0.530 
P-Value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
 Goodness-of-fit measures 
Log likelihood -48.02 -37.29 -34.53 -34.59 -35.04 
Likelihood ratio 24.07 45.52 51.04 50.92 50.03 
AIC 104.03 82.59 77.06 77.19 78.08 
Count R² 0.71 0.71 0.69 0.67 0.65 
Adj. count R² 0.30 0.30 0.26 0.22 0.17 
McKelvey & Zavoina R² 0.43 0.68 0.74 0.76 0.76 
17.91 11.85 7.16 4.28 2.91 
Score test for the equal 











Notes:    The ordered probit estimations are performed with four outcome categories of dependent variable   -   
change to the reference rate: "increase", "no change", "0.25% decrease", and "0.50 % decrease". Three threshold 
estimates are not reported. 
Count R² is the proportion of correct predictions. The predicted choice is one with the highest predicted 
probability. Adj. count R² is the proportion of correct predictions beyond the number that would be correctly 
guessed by choosing the outcome category with the largest percentage of observed cases. 






Comparison with market anticipation  







     
Proportion of correct predictions 0.69 0.84 0.91 0.96 
     
Average likelihood of observed rate changes 0.63 0.78 0.84 0.92 
     
MAE of E(Y|X), basis points 10.27 7.25 4.60 2.84 
     
 
Notes:   The predictions are made in terms of four possible policy choices: "increase", "no change", 
"decrease -0.25%", or "decrease -0.50%" in the reference rate. The predicted choice is one with the highest 
predicted probability. 
"MAE of E(Y|X)" is a mean absolute error, calculated with respect to the actual observed (non-consolidated) 
reference rate changes, where E(Y|X) = P(Y=-0.5|X)*(-0.5) + P(Y=-0.25|X)*(-0.25) + P(Y=0|X)*(0) + 
P(Y>0|X)*(0.375). 
Model 14.1: ExInf_T_M, GDPnaiy, ExInf_T_M* Ind_ExInf_T. 
Model 14.2: ExInf_T_M, GDPnaiy, ExInf_T_M* Ind_ExInf_T, and WIBOR12m_ZP. 
For definitions of variable mnemonics see Tables 4 and 5. 
TABLE 14. 
Policy rules in 2002/04 - 2006/10 
































































































































































































Parameter estimate 4.024 1.437 8.988 11.363 4.654 28.479 32.425 4.188 1.557 8.830 9.177 3.898 21.340 24.593 
Standard error 1.195 0.294 2.799 5.042 1.916 11.513 14.651 1.233 0.318 2.679 3.679 1.469 8.111 10.557 
P-Value 0.0008 <.0001 0.0013 0.0242 0.0152 0.0134 0.0269 0.0007 <.0001 0.0010 0.0126 0.0080 0.0085 0.0198 
 Limit_1 Limit_2 Limit_3 Limit_1 Limit_2 Limit_3  Limit_1 Limit_2 Limit_3 Limit_1 Limit_2 Limit_3  
Parameter estimate 0.735 3.158 12.424 2.960 12.246 43.831  0.943 3.336 12.629 2.948 9.680 34.116  
Standard error 0.551 0.756 2.748 1.438 5.368 18.158  0.585 0.782 2.738 1.367 3.898 12.939  
P-Value 0.1822 <.0001 <.0001 0.0395 0.0225 0.0158  0.1073 <.0001 <.0001 0.0311 0.0130 0.0084  
 Goodness-of-fit measures 
Log likelihood -15.51 -7.13 -15.49 -8.15 
Likelihood ratio 89.07 105.84 89.13 103.80 
AIC 43.03 28.26 42.97 30.31 
Count R² 0.91 0.96 0.91 0.95 
Adj. count R² 0.78 0.91 0.78 0.87 
McKelvey & Zavoina R² 0.96 1.00 0.96 0.99 
Adjusted Estrella R² 0.89 0.96 0.89 0.95 
Cragg-Uhler-2  R² 0.90 0.96 0.90 0.96 
8.79 8.64 9.02 9.24 Score test for the equal 
slopes assumption p-value = 0.185 p-value =  0.3732 p-value = 0.173 p-value =  0.322 
 
Notes:   The ordered probit estimations are performed with four outcome categories of dependent variable - change to the reference rate: "0.50% or 0.25% increase", "no 
change", "0.25% decrease", and "0.50% decrease". 
Count R² is the proportion of correct predictions. The predicted choice is one with the highest predicted probability. Adj. count R² is the proportion of correct predictions 
beyond the number that would be correctly guessed by choosing the outcome category with the largest percentage of observed cases. 
For definitions of variable mnemonics see Tables 4 and 5. 
TABLE 15. 
Tests for interest rate smoothing in 2002/04 - 2006/10 
 
 






























































Parameter estimate 4.054 1.414 9.030 0.744 4.234 1.528 8.949 1.010 
Standard error 1.205 0.300 2.792 1.492 1.258 0.325 2.696 1.529 
P-Value 0.0008 <.0001 0.0012 0.6181 0.0008 <.0001 0.0009 0.5089 
  Goodness-of-fit measures 
Log likelihood -15.39 -15.27 
Likelihood ratio 89.32 89.56 
AIC 44.78 44.54 
Count R² 0.93 0.93 
Adj. count R² 0.83 0.83 
McKelvey & Zavoina R² 0.96 0.96 
 
Notes: 
The ordered probit estimations are performed with four outcome categories of dependent variable - change 
to the reference rate: "0.50% or 0.25% increase", "no change", "0.25% decrease", and "0.50% decrease". Three 
threshold estimates are not reported. 
Count R² is the proportion of correct predictions. The predicted choice is one with the highest predicted 
probability. Adj. count R² is the proportion of correct predictions beyond the number that would be correctly guessed 
by choosing the outcome category with the largest percentage of observed cases. 
RRC_L1 is the lagged reference rate change. 








Dependent variable: the reference rate change with four outcome categories: "increase", "no change", 
"0.25% decrease", and "0.50% decrease". 
Independent variables: ExInf_T_M, GDPnaiy, ExInf_T_M*Ind_ExInf_T, WIBOR12m_ZP. 






Dependent variable: the reference rate change with four outcome categories: "increase", "no change", 
"0.25% decrease", and "0.50 % decrease". 
Independent variables: ExInf_T_M, GVATnaiy, ExInf_T_M*Ind_ExInf_T, WIBOR12m_ZP. 




In-sample prediction of policy rate changes 
 
 
Predicted decision Actual 






Adj. noise to 
signal ratio, 
% 
hike 3 0 0 0 3 3 0 
no change 0 31 1 0 31 32 4.5 
0.25% cut 0 1 9 1 9 11 2.8 
0.50% cut 0 0 0 9 9 9 2.2 




Sample period: 2002/04 - 2006/10. 
The ordered probit estimations are performed for the specification 14.4. 
A particular choice is predicted if its predicted probability exceeds the predicted probabilities of 
the alternatives. 
An ‘adjusted noise-to-signal ratio’, introduced by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), is defined as 
follows. Let A denote the event that the decision is predicted and occurred; let B denote the event that the 
decision is predicted but not occurred; let C denote the event that the decision is not predicted but 
occurred; let D denote the event that the decision is not predicted and not occurred. The desirable 
outcomes fall into categories A and D, while noisy ones fall into categories B and C. A perfect prediction 
would have no entries in B and C, while a noisy prediction would have many entries in B and C, but few in 
A and D. The ‘adjusted noise-to-signal’ ratio is defined as [B/(B+D)]/[A/(A+C)]. 
 
TABLE 18. 









































Actual change, % 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0.25 0 0.25 0 0 
Forecast by Model 14.3 
Pr(y=-0.50%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pr(y=-0.25%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pr(y=0%) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.94 1.00 0.84 0.97 0.00 0.75 0.94 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Pr(y>=0.25%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.16 0.03 1.00 0.25 0.06 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Predicted change, % 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0.25 0 0 
Forecast  by Model 14.4 
Pr(y=-0.50%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pr(y=-0.25%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pr(y=0%) 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.64 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.03 0.86 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Pr(y>=0.25%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.97 0.14 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Predicted change, % 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.25 0 0.25 0 0 
Market anticipation (forecast from Reuters survey of banks’ analysts) 
Pr(y=-0.50%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pr(y=-0.25%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pr(y=0%) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.05 1.00 0.90 1.00 0.19 1.00 0.89 
Pr(y>=0.25%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.95 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.81 0.00 0.11 
Predicted change, % 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 
 
Notes:    Model 14.3: ExInf_T_M, GVATnaiy, ExInf_T_M*Ind_ExInf_T; Model 14.4: ExInf_T_M, GVATnaiy, ExInf_T_M*Ind_ExInf_T, WIBOR12m_ZP. 
 The forecasting by models 14.3 and 14.4 is performed using ordered probit models estimated for the period 2002/04-2006/02 without rolling re-estimation. 
 The Reuters survey of banks’ analysts is conducted a day prior to a policy meeting of the MPC. 
 The predicted choice is one with the highest probability. 
TABLE 19. 
Policy rules in 2002/04 - 2006/10, based on revised data at monthly frequency 
 
































































































































































































Parameter estimate 4.042 1.432 6.043 4.048 1.451 6.124 -0.056 4.068 1.657 8.333 4.054 1.671 8.434 -0.040 
Standard error 1.204 0.304 1.919 1.213 0.313 1.963 0.159 1.248 0.354 2.281 1.249 0.362 2.345 0.178 
P-Value 0.0008 <.0001 0.0016 0.0008 <.0001 0.0018 0.7231 0.0011 <.0001 0.0003 0.0012 <.0001 0.0003 0.8233 
 Limit_1 Limit_2 Limit_3 Limit_1 Limit_2 Limit_3  Limit_1 Limit_2 Limit_3 Limit_1 Limit_2 Limit_3  
Parameter estimate 1.345 3.520 11.941 1.360 3.538 12.046  1.553 3.773 13.576 1.564 3.788 13.674  
Standard error 0.643 0.831 2.480 0.648 0.839 2.534  0.697 0.878 2.869 0.698 0.883 2.921  
P-Value 0.0365 <.0001 <.0001 0.0359 <.0001 <.0001  0.0258 <.0001 <.0001 0.0251 <.0001 <.0001  
 Goodness-of-fit measures 
Log likelihood -18.20 -18.14 -17.24 -17.22 
AIC 48.40 50.27 46.48 48.44 
Count R² 0.85 0.85 0.87 0.87 
Adj. count R² 0.65 0.65 0.70 0.70 
McKelvey & Zavoina R² 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.96 
 
Notes: 
 The ordered probit estimations are performed with four outcome categories of dependent variable – monthly change to the reference rate: "0.50% or 0.25% increase", "no 
change", "0.25% decrease", and "0.50% decrease". 
 Count R² is the proportion of correct predictions. The predicted choice is one with the highest predicted probability. Adj. count R² is the proportion of correct predictions 
beyond the number that would be correctly guessed by choosing the outcome category with the largest percentage of observed cases. 
For definitions of variable mnemonics see Tables 4 and 5. 
TABLE 20. 
 Comparison of policy rules, based on revised and real-time data 
 
Specification ExInf_T_M GDPRna_Y ExInf_T_M* Ind_ExInf_T 
Real-time data available at MPC meetings 
Parameter estimate 3.348 1.469 9.115 
Standard error 1.032 0.365 2.808 
P-Value 0.0012 <.0001 0.0012 
 Limit_1 Limit_2 Limit_3 
Parameter estimate 0.807 2.718 12.121 
Standard error 0.612 0.784 3.861 
P-Value 0.1872 0.0005 0.0017 
Goodness-of-fit measures 
Log likelihood -19.04 
AIC 50.07 
Count R² 0.85 
Adj. count R² 0.65 
McKelvey & Zavoina R² 0.96 
Revised data at monthly frequency 
Parameter estimate 3.744 0.803 5.774 
Standard error 0.962 0.185 1.640 
P-Value <.0001 <.0001 0.0004 
 Limit_1 Limit_2 Limit_3 
Parameter estimate 0.873 2.142 7.812 
Standard error 0.603 0.643 1.593 
P-Value 0.1478 0.0009 <.0001 
Goodness-of-fit measures 
Log likelihood -29.48 
AIC 70.96 
Count R² 0.76 
Adj. count R² 0.43 
McKelvey & Zavoina R² 0.89 
 
Notes: 
       The ordered probit estimations are performed with four outcome categories of dependent variable – 
change to the reference rate: "0.50% or 0.25% increase", "no change", "0.25% decrease", and "0.50% 
decrease" for the period 2002/04 - 2006/10. 
 Count R² is the proportion of correct predictions. The predicted choice is one with the highest predicted 
probability. Adj. count R² is the proportion of correct predictions beyond the number that would be correctly 
guessed by choosing the outcome category with the largest percentage of observed cases. 
For definitions of variable mnemonics see Tables 4 and 5. 
 
TABLE 21. 
Policy rules, estimated using linear OLS regression 
 
Specification 14.3 Specification 14.4 
Specification 
Intercept ExInf_T_M GVATnaiy ExInf_T_M* Ind_ExInf_T Intercept ExInf_T_M GVATnaiy 
ExInf_T_M* 
Ind_ExInf_T WIBOR12m_ZP 
Parameter estimate -0.380 0.203 0.080 0.115 -0.381 0.201 0.079 0.106 0.058 
Standard error 0.040 0.058 0.011 0.097 0.041 0.058 0.011 0.099 0.115 
P-Value <.0001 0.0010 <.0001 0.2406 <.0001 0.0012 <.0001 0.2905 0.6189 
  Goodness-of-fit measures 
F Value 37.55 27.81 
Pr > F <.0001 <.0001 
Root MSE 0.1319 0.1328 
R² 0.688 0.680 
Adj. R² 0.670 0.665 
Durbin-Watson D 1.881 1.959 
 
Notes: 
 Sample: 2002/04 – 2006/10. 
Dependent variable: historical (non-consolidated) change to the reference rate made at a policy meeting of the MPC. 




Comparison of linear regression, rounded linear regression, interval 
regression and ordered probit models 
 
Model: LR RLR IR OP 
Specification 14.3: ExInf_T_M, GVATnaiy, ExInf_T_M*Ind_ExInf_T 
Cut-point 1 -0.50 -0.25 -0.375 -0.50 -0.375 -0.50 0.94 
Cut-point 2 -0.25 0.00 -0.125 -0.25 -0.125 -0.25 3.34 
Cut-point 3 
 
0.00 0.25 0.125 0.25 0.125 0.25 12.63 
Goodness-of-fit measures 
MAE of E(Y|X), basis points 9.92 17.22 14.44 10.16 10.36 10.02 6.03 4.50 
Count R²  0.55 0.42 0.78 0.73 0.69 0.87 0.91 
Adjusted count R²  -0.09 -0.39 0.48 0.35 0.26 0.70 0.78 
Average likelihood  0.46 0.46 0.56 0.66 0.65 0.79 0.84 
Log likelihood  -55.25 -52.87 -36.45 -36.64 -30.94 -19.18 -15.49 
Likelihood ratio chi-square tests 
Number of constraints  6 6 6 6 3 3   
Chi-square statistic  79.53 74.76 41.92 42.31 30.90 7.39   
P-value  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0604   
Specification 14.4: ExInf_T_M, GVATnaiy, ExInf_T_M*Ind_ExInf_T, WIBOR12m_ZP 
Cut-point 1 -0.50 -0.25 -0.375 -0.50 -0.375 -0.50 2.95 
Cut-point 2 -0.25 0.00 -0.125 -0.25 -0.125 -0.25 9.68 
Cut-point 3 0.00 0.25 0.125 0.25 0.125 0.25 34.12 
Goodness-of-fit measures 
MAE of E(Y|X), basis points 9.87 17.26 14.36 10.07 10.31 9.96 5.38 3.10 
Count R² 0.55 0.44 0.78 0.73 0.71 0.87 0.95 
Adjusted count R² -0.09 -0.35 0.48 0.35 0.30 0.70 0.87 
Average likelihood 0.46 0.46 0.56 0.66 0.65 0.82 0.91 
Log likelihood 
 
-54.88 -52.36 -36.21 -36.16 -29.70 -15.58 -8.15 
Likelihood ratio chi-square tests 
Number of constraints  7 7 7 7 3 3  
Chi-square statistic  93.45 88.41 56.11 56.02 43.10 14.85  
P-value  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0020  
 
Notes: 
   LR - linear regression model estimated by OLS; RLR – extended ‘rounded linear regression’ model, which 
is identical to the constrained interval regression model with all coefficients β and σ² restricted to be the same as in 
the LR estimated by OLS; IR - interval regression model; OP - ordered probit model. 
Sample period: 2002/04 - 2006/10. 
The estimations are performed with four outcome categories of dependent variable - change to the reference 
rate: "0.50% or 0.25% increase", "no change", "0.25% decrease", and "0.50% decrease". 
In the RLR, IR and OP the E(Y|X) = P(Y=-0.5|X)*(-0.5) + P(Y=-0.25|X)*(-0.25) + P(Y=0|X)*(0) + 
P(Y>0|X)*(0.5+0.5+0.25)/3, where (0.5+0.5+0.25)/3 = E(Y|Y>0, X). In the LR the E(Y|X) = X*b. 
"MAE of E(Y|X)" - mean absolute error - is calculated with respect to the actual observed (non-consolidated) 
reference rate changes. 
For definitions of variable mnemonics see Tables 4 and 5. 
